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The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord 1997 signed between the Government of 
Bangladesh and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), recognises the 
reestablishment of the rights of the indigenous people with the formation of locals & regional 
councils as controlling and supervisory bodies over land & land management, law & order, 
civil administration, police (local), development, primary & secondary education, forest & 
environment, and many more. After more than a decade of signing, the Accord has not been 
implemented fully and the violations of human rights continue.  
 
This study examines the challenges which Bangladesh as a post-war state face, in 
establishing democratic institutions and particularly indigenous institutions in order to bring 
justice and peace in the disputed CHT region. This study describes how the Land Dispute 
Resolution Commission which has been formed in 1999 to settle the land disputes between 
the indigenous people and Bengali settlers, can make its activities responsive to both a 
diverse constituency of indigenous people without ignoring the Bengali migrants and all the 
same gains trust and ownership among the Hillpeople.  
 
The study describes ‘the state of nature and politics’, ‘civil military relations’, ‘nation and 
identity building’ and ‘the geopolitical’ issues and how these issues played a key role in the 
policy formation process for CHT. In other words, I am keen to examine whether or not these 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
Violent conflict is frequently accompanied by a change in land distribution and property 
rights. With the end of an armed conflict, especially a prolonged one involving significant 
displacement creates a situation whereby a significant proportion of the affected population 
will begin to seek access or reaccess to lands and land resources.1 Given the size of the rural 
population pursuing this endeavour in many post conflict scenarios, this can be one of the 
primary features of a post-war phase. 2  People with insecure tenure rights are often 
indiscriminately or forcibly removed from their land often without fair compensation or due 
to process.3 Competing land claims usually resulted from distinct historical periods such as 
colonial era titles and titles issued during illegal occupations, as well as claims based on 
informal customary land use. Tenure insecurity also arises in post-war situations where 
people have been competing with claims to the same piece of land.4 Government sponsored 
resettlement schemes can also displace people from the homes and lands and this 
displacement can be intentional, which we can find in the case of Tanzania, Nigeria, 
Mozambique, Indonesia, Kosovo, Angola and Bangladesh. In Mozambique and Angola 
forced settlement schemes led to both the wars for independence and also contributed to the 
civil wars following independence. Indonesian government policy of Javanese population 
resettlement from the main crowded island to other parts of the archipelago, and land seizures 
for the benefit of the settlers, resulted violence between indigenous groups and settlers that 
have driven several states.5 In the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh more than 100,000 
indigenous people were being relocated without fair compensation in the 1960s, when a 
reservoir was created for hydroelectricity and a paper mill for development of the area.6 
Under the Bangladesh government resettlement schemes in the year 1979 and the early 80s, 
around 200,000 to 400,000 landless Bangali farmers from several Districts settled in the CHT 
areas,7 to shift the demographic pattern and balance of power and to weaken the supremacy 
of the Hillpeople in CHT. 8 Government involvement that supports (or is perceived to support) 
one side over another can significantly increase tensions, which pictures in the Rwanda, 
Bangladesh and Burundi cases. The Bangladesh Army has been regularly accused of siding 
                                                 
1 Pantuliano, Sara 2009: 193 
2 Unruh, Jon D. 2003: 354 
3 USAID 2005: 3 
4 Ibid 
5 Ibid 
6 Shelley, Mizanur Rahman 1992: 31 
7 Roy, Raja Devasish 2002: 5  
8 Jamil & Panday 2008: 468 
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with the Bengali settlers. In a recent clash in the Sajek Union under Rangamati District on 
19-20 February 2010, 4-8 people were killed and dozens of houses were set on fire at 
Mahajanpara and Milanpur villages.9 Bor Chakma, a resident of Kajachhara claimed, ‘‘if the 
army did not cooperate with the settlers, this level of destruction could never be taken 
place’’.10 Jon D. Unruh mentions that even conflict which had no land component initially 
can lead to tenure problems in the peace process, due to the spatial nature of both land tenure 
and armed combat.11 In Bangladesh, although CHT leadership demanded autonomous rule of 
CHT for more than half a century, the issue of land as a separate issue, or as a key issue is not 
even noticeable up to the 1980s. It became however noticeable when JSS submitted five-
points demand to the Bangladesh government, included a demand for the removal of all 
Bangali settlers who had been settled in the region since 1947.12  Peace Accord or Treaty also 
attempts to reconstitute institutions or building new institutions at various levels to 
implement the accord. But when it comes to the land issue, ‘‘the difficulty stems more from 
issue of legitimacy (historical occupation and supported by oral histories) and from the 
institutional inability to effectively recognize and resolve important tenure issues’’.13 ‘Trust 
and ownership building’, ‘use and access rights’ are often complicated and problematic in a 
post-war re-establishment. Not only do new laws need to address, but new laws must 
embrace what people are already doing ‘on the ground’. In a case from India, local level state 
officials are given the discretion to operate at the interface between formal and informal legal 
systems and pursue opportunities for adjustments between systems. Without seeking to 
impose state law, officials attempt to convince, co-opt, or realistically use any legal system, 
custom, norm or combination thereof to attain the state’s objectives.14  The objective of 
forming the CHT Land Dispute Resolution Commission is to settle the land disputes among 
the Indigenous people and Bengali settlers and bring peace and harmony in the Hill. It is also 
stated that the Commission shall settle disputes according to the existing rules, customs and 




The CHT Land Dispute Resolution Commission was formed in 1999, under the provisions of 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (CHT Peace Accord 1997), to settle down the land 
                                                 
9 ACHR, 23 February 2010 
10 NEWAGE Xtra, March 5-11, 2010  
11 Unruh, Jon D. 2002: 338 
12 Roy, Raja Devasish 2000: 3 
13 Unruh, Jon D. 2002: 337 
14 Unruh, Jon D. 2004: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/land_tenure/ 
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disputes among the indigenous people and the Bangali settlers, who are claiming ownership 
for the same piece of land. In addition to settling disputes of lands of the rehabilitated tribal 
refugees, shall have full power for cancellation of ownership of those lands and Hills, which 
have been so far illegally settled and occupied. It provides further that the decisions of the 
commission will be final and that no appeals will lie against its decision (Clause 4, Part D of 
the 1997 Accord). Though the government has officially declared the constitution of the 
Commission through a formal notification, its exact terms of reference and the detailed nature 
of its functions are not yet known.15 Two Commission Chairman served, since the formation 
of the Land Dispute Resolution Commission in June 3, 1999, without any progress to settle 
the land disputes. The current Commission Chairman, who took over the office in July 19, 
2009, started his work to solve the land disputes within the given three years period of time, 
and assured that land held under customary law, will be considered when determining land 
disputes. The Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), signing party of the Accord, 
has demanded to amend 21 provisions of the CHT Land Dispute Settlement Commission Act 
2001, which are contradictory with the CHT Accord. 16  The Chairman’s decisions for 
conducting a cadastral survey of CHT lands, and issuing a public notice on March 17, 2010 
inviting applications to settle land disputes without consultation and informing the 
Commission Members, again make the Commission dysfunctional. The Commission 
Members have censured for this unilateral decision of the Commission Chairman and started 
boycotting the Commission meetings, arguing for the amendment of the contradictory 
provisions of the 2001 Act first. Gautam Dewan, a prominent politician of CHT had summed 
up the CHT problem as ‘‘Land is the crux of the problem in CHT. Unless the Hillpeople get 
back their land rights, there cannot be a successful resolution to the problem.’’17A writer on 
CHT issue concluded that ‘‘to any observer of the CHT, it is crystal clear that peace in the 
CHT is largely dependent upon the resolution of the land issue’’.18  
 
Aim(s) and Research Questions 
 
The main aim of this study is to analyze the role of institutions in a post-war situation, and 
how these institutions can play an important role to implement the peace process and 
maintain long term stable peace through establishing and recognizing indigenous rights 
particularly indigenous land rights. To do this I will focus on the Chittagong Hill Tracts  
                                                 
15 Ministry of Land, Circulation 3 June 1999  
16 PCJSS  
17 Mohsin, Amena 1997:111 
18 Ibid 1998: 114 
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Land Dispute Resolution Commission and how this institution can contribute to the long-
term stable peace by building up ‘trust and ownership’ along with the indigenous and Bengali 
settlers in CHT areas and with other stakeholders. To unfold this objective, the following 
research questions will be formulated;  
  
• How far has the Commission succeeded in building trust and ownership along the 
Indigenous people and the Bengali settlers in the Hill Districts?  
• Whether the national politics and policy-making process have influenced trust and 
ownership building process? 
 
Significance of the Study 
 
Reforming land tenure is an integral part of most post-conflict development, CHT 
Bangladesh is not exceptional.  It is fair to say that land policy as an element of peace-
building missions tend to be under-rated and has received little attention in the academic 
literature. Experiences from developing countries have shown that there is no magic wand 
solution to intractable land conflict. Certainty of titles can not be restored simply through 
state fiat. Community acceptance and political support are essential components for 
establishing a viable system of land administration. Most recent history witnessed a gradual 
recognition of customary land tenure including Malawi, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Venezuela, 
Bolivia and parts of the Philippines.19 Land and attachment of land play a fundamental role in 
the identity formation of groups and individuals. The peace process must recognize the 
impact of local land tenure issues and examine local and not merely national needs. Land 
policy must work to create institutions and laws to meet claims for property restitution. 
Considering the reviewed literature as well as the scope of this research, this study attempts 
to contribute to the existing empirical knowledge about ethnic land conflict. The study will 
therefore focus on how identity formation, political system and absence of democratic values 
contribute towards the recognition and establishment of the indigenous rights. Moreover, it 
will make a significant contribution to the field of indigenous academic and policy discourses; 
particularly on how the understanding changes and the relations of continuity between the 
state and indigenous people.  
 
 
                                                 
19 Adam, Jeroen 2010: 401 
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Though the scholar used the term ‘‘trust’ in the post-war reconstruction and governance 
literature, it has no clear or common definition. Trust has a direct relation with ‘logical act’ 
but is not synonymous with ‘confidence’ and ‘satisfaction’ and based on the outcomes of the 
service and the way it is delivered.20 Negatively it is associated with the absence of threats of 
renewed violence and human rights violations and positively with confidence in post-war 
order. On micro level trust is used mostly in connection with community relations, 
particularly efforts to restore or establish positive communication among communities or 
individuals that were previously divided by violence. 21  It can also be about wider 
considerations around service delivery in public service sectors. Trust building is the major 
challenge in any post-war situation. And ‘‘minorities may have little trust in constitution and 
so, even when convinced the ethnic majority may lack the power to commit itself in a 
credible manner’’.22 By employing the term ‘trust’ and its opposite distrust, I want to explore 
if and how the different peoples of CHT region are using their own distinct morally infused 





The buzzword, ‘ownership’ is commonly used term in the development sector, especially in 
the statebuilding operations. However, the term ‘ownership’ begs the question of what? and  
by whom. IMF Working Papers, WP/02/72 (2002) claims that the concept is ambiguous and 
vague because it can not be observed; evidence for its existence is indirect and incomplete at 
best; the concept is dynamic and hence a continuously changing target; for any one policy 
there are dozens of disparate potential owners, not all of whom can or will agree to any single 
outcome; and governments are rife with heterogeneity even given the assumption that there is 
only a single level of government that is relevant.23 The meaning also range from a sense of 
attachment to a programme or operation, to actual controlling authority. In a post-war 
situation, with its most positive sense, it reflects a desire on the part of external actors to 
avoid undermining pre-existing local process that may be the most effective response to local 
                                                 
20 Protais, Musoni 2007:2 
21 Sorbo, Gunnar M. 2004: 18 
22 Bigombe, Betty, Collier, Paul & Sambanis, Nicholas 2000:332 
23 Scheye, Eric & Peake, Gordon 2005: 236 
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political questions. Ownership may refer to how a population comes to regard certain policies 
‘as their own’. Their involvement may be either passive (policies are designed to be 
responsive to local circumstances, culture, etc) or active (policies are designed through 
consultation with local actors). Ownership may also refer to decision making structures.24 
Here, the term ‘ownership’ is employed in order to investigate if and how the Land Dispute 
Resolution Commission is responsive, consultative and accountable to the CHT-people, and 
whether the local peoples (both Indigenous and Bengalis) have any control in the decision 
making process & through their participation as well as consent. If they have a degree of 
influence and ability to make the Commission accountable, are there any difference between 




The study is organized in seven chapters. In this chapter I introduce a brief introduction about 
the relationship of land and conflict and how indigenous land rights issues have been 
addressed in the post-accord situation. I also provide the problem, aim(s) and research 
questions, the definition of the concepts which being used in the study in this chapter. The 
following chapter is designed to shed light on methodological consideration, concerning the 
data collection and trust gaining in the research area. The third chapter deals with the 
theoretical consideration-focusing on indigenous land rights issues. The fourth chapter 
highlights the historical and political context which being used to suppress indigenous people 
movement and abolish their traditional land rights. Nation and identity building crisis, 
militarization, causes of land conflict in CHT and the development and signing of the 1997 
Peace Accord also discussed in this chapter. Chapter five is designed to analysis the points 
which the study focused, including the theoretical and practical challenges for post-war 
indigenous institution building and trust and ownership building challenges in the community. 
Chapter six will analyse the nature of state, military influence in politics and administration, 
the role of political parties to establish a democratic society and how these points influence in 
the policy making issues to establish indigenous traditional rights. The final chapter will draw 
a conclusion about the points which are crucial in establishing indigenous rights and make a 





                                                 
24 Chesterman, Simon 2007: 10 
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Chapter Two: Methodology 
 
Data have been regarded as the main asset of economic and social research. And data 
collection method depends on choice of methodology. Silverman and Punch point out that 
‘the choice of method should not be pre-determined; rather researcher should choose a 
method that is appropriate to what the researcher is trying to find out. 25  Choice of 
methodology should be driven to address the research questions. And if the topic is 
‘sensitive’ then the researcher should take extra care about choosing methodology. My 
research topic is very sensitive, as land has become the major source of fighting between the 
Bengali settlers and indigenous people of CHT.26 And fighting for supremacy between the 
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), signing party of the Accord and the 
United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF), the opposing party of the Accord has increased.27 
And indigenous peoples traditionally consider land with a spirituality and sacredness not 
generally comprehensible to others. For indigenous peoples, land is not merely a productive 
resource, a habitat of political boundary. As Victoria Tauli-Corpuz states, ‘‘For Indigenous 
Peoples keeping our territorial or ancestral lands is the most important thing. This is what 
determines our identity. This is where our ancestors walked and where they learned 
everything they left us. Our land is where we forge our relations with Mother Earth and 
create social bonds with each other’’.
28
 This chapter will focus on the methodological 
instruments and strategies used to search for the answer to the research questions: how far 
has the Commission succeeded in building trust and ownership along the indigenous people 
and the Bengali settlers in the Hill Districts? And whether the national politics and policy-
making process have influenced trust and ownership building process? 
 
Selection of Research Area 
 
The situation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) area claims to be similar as other post-war 
communities, which suffered from historical and state repression through various state 
                                                 
25  Silverman, David coded from Punch 1998: 244-245. 
26 
The Daily Star Tuesday, January 25, 2011: At least 300 people were killed and around 900 others injured 
related with land violence since the signing of the Accord in 1997. 
27 
Since December 1998 more than 500 member of Parbatya Chottogram Jana Saghati Samity (PCJSS) and the 
United People's Democratic Front (UPDF) killed and about 1000 injured. Jamil, Ishtiaq and Panday, Pranab 
Kumar 2009: 1066. From 2010 the internal gunfight has significantly increased between the PCJSS and UPDF 
resulting in more than 30 indigenous leader and activists killed. And abduction becomes a regular phenomenon 
in CHT. Sources: Daily Newspapers of Bangladesh.  
28 
Carino, Jill K. 2006: 2  
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mechanisms. CHT comprises the south-eastern region of Bangladesh with a total surface area 
of 13,189 sq. km., one tenth of the total land of Bangladesh and divided into three   
 




Source: Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs, Government of Bangladesh 
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administrative Hill Districts of Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban and shares 
international boundaries with India and Burma.29 The original inhabitants of CHT belong to 
12 ethnic groups, with their own individual culture, customs and language.30 The economy of 
the indigenous people is land-based, and engaged in subsistence swidden cultivation, also 
know as ‘jum’ also referred to as ‘slash and burn’ or ‘shifting cultivation’.31 In early June, 
2010, I visited many villages in Khagrachari and Rangamati Districts and selected the 
Dighinala, Panchhari and Khagrachari Sadar Upazilla of Khagrachari District and Kawkhali, 
Langadu and Rangamati Sadar Upazilla of Rangamati District for field data collection. In 
these areas32, a large number of Bengali settlers are living and often engage in violence with 
the indigenous people. Besides, numbers of returnee refuges and IDPs are also living. A large 
portion of land also acquired by the state agencies for establishing security camps and 
training centres and other development purposes.  
 
Selection of Respondents 
 
Sampling of respondents plays an important role to collect valuable primary data. Selection 
of the sample should not be pre-set, and could be driven by the theoretical framework.33 The 
researcher can choose ‘probability sampling’ (such as random sampling), ‘convenience 
sampling’ or ‘purposeful sampling’. Purposeful selection or criterion-based selection 34 
follows neither probability nor convenience way, but this strategy is used when it is difficult 
to get information through other sampling choices. In my research I use purposeful selection 
                                                 
29 CHT District Statistics 1983, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Ministry of Planning, 
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 
30 More details at The Chittagong Hill Tracts; Life and Nature at Risk, published by Society for Environment 
and Human Development (SEHD) in 2000.  
31 Roy, Rajkumari Chandra. 2000: 24 
32 In Dighinala, 10,073 indigenous families and 3,858 Bengali settler families, in Panchhari: 8,096 indigenous 
people and 5,438 Bengali settler families, in Khagrachari Sadar 8,826 indigenous families and 2,653 Bengali 
settler families live. Most of the Bengali families live in the cluster village with food supplies from the 
Bangladesh Government (Source: Khagrachari DC Office, 2009). There is strong accusation against the 
Bangladesh Army for backing Bengali settlers to forcible evict indigenous Jumma peoples to grab land and to 
destroy the Tila Buddhist temple in Dighinala Upazilla in August 2007. In Panchhari (1 May 1986) hundreds of 
Jummas (actual number not known) were killed and injured by the Bangladesh Army. 80,000 Jummas fled 
across the border to India. Even in the present situation often violence occurred for land grabbing issues by the 
Bengali settlers, indigenous women were raped and people have been killed. Security forces also grabbed land 
for building construction and security camps and in most cases indigenous people did not get accurate 
compensation. In Khagrachari Sadar Upazilla indigenous people’s land has also been grabbed by Government 
itself for constructing offices and other development purposes. Indigenous people of both Kawkhali and 
Langadu Upazilla have suffered the same land grabbing problems by the Bengali settlers. In 4 May 1989 - the 
Bangladeshi settlers murdered 40 Jummas and the dead bodies were never recovered in Langadu. Now days 
Langadu Upazilla has become a fighting ground between UPDF and PCJSS. Both indigenous and Bengali 
people who last their land in the Kaptai Dam area living in the Asam Basti and Omadamia Tila of the Sadar 
Rangamati Upazilla, as their lands have been grabbed by somebody or waiting for compensation from 
government.  
33 Silverman, David 2005: 23 
34 Light et al., 1990: 53 
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criteria. I have collected data in the month July and August of 2010 in Khagrachari and 
Rangamati District of CHT and the Capital City, Dhaka. I interviewed thirty five people both 
from indigenous and Bengali community, who claim the disputed land ownership. In 
Khagrachari, I selected my indigenous respondents, who have conflict over land but do not 
file cases. And Bengali respondents, who filed cases in the Land Dispute Resolution 
Commission.35 In Rangamati, I selected only those who filed cases in the Land Dispute 
Resolution Commission both from Bengali and indigenous community. 36  Besides I 
interviewed ten civil society members from Rangamati, Khagrachari and Dhaka; 37  two 
members of PCJSS, one Members and Chairman of the Commission to get the insights of the 
conflict and the overall situation of present crisis.   
 
 Table 01: Number of Respondents by Ethnicity and District 
   
Name of District Indigenous Bengali Gender 
 Case Filed Not Filed Case Filed Male Female 
Khagrachari 1 13 8 20 2 
Rangamati 6 0 7 11 2 
TOTAL 20 15 31 4 
 
 
Trust Gaining in the Field 
 
Trust is a crucial element in gaining access to potential research respondents in conflict zones 
and can vary between cultures, disciplines and individuals.38 Access does not always ensure 
trust from the community and for gaining trust needs to work on day to day. Because people 
are often suspicious or fearful of a researcher’s motives and may initially be wary of 
engaging in interactions, especially in post-war societies,39 where laws and rules have been 
violated or abused; people living under state oppression; communal violence is present in 
various degrees, and there are large flows of refugees and internally displaced persons. 
Trusting relationship with gatekeepers can makes it easier to build trust with the people in the 
                                                 
35 I collect the list from Land Dispute Resolution Commission Office.  
36 In Khagrachari, I found a very few number of indigenous people filed case in the Land Dispute Resolution 
Commission but in Rangamati, the number was higher. 
37 3 Non indigenous civil society members from Dhaka and 1 from Rangamati. 
38 Norman, M. Julie 2009: 71. Got Trust? The Challenges of Gaining Access in Conflict Zones. 
39
 Hammersley, M., & Atkinson, P. 2007. Ethnography: Principles in practice (3rd ed.). NewYork: Taylor & 
Francis.  
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field. Because ‘whether or not people have knowledge of social research, they are often more 
concerned with what kind of person the researcher is than with the research itself. They will 
try to gauge how far he or she can be trusted, what he or she might be able to offer as an 
acquaintance or a friend, and perhaps also how easily he or she could be manipulated or 
exploited.’’40 I have been fortunate as I found a Bangladeshi student from an indigenous 
community in my university, who has completed his research on indigenous land rights 
issues and currently working as a development activist. I discussed my topic with him along 
with the possible research questions and he helped me to identify the research area. He 
introduced some people to me over the phone, and I easily entered into the indigenous 
community and got a warm welcome as like many other previous colonial societies, where 
someone’s word is more important than papers or signatures.41 During my fieldwork period, I 
also discussed my research topic with three respected retired teachers from the indigenous 
community to know the situation and history. They were however not my respondents. I 
openly share my personal background and the research objectives with simple and easy way 
as people are usually more willing to speak if they know something about your background, 
your interests, the topic of the research,42 without getting into details about the hypothesis or 
main questions, as they may confuse them-especially when dealing with people, less familiar 
with the academic work. Bengali respondents easily accepted and trusted me as a member of 




I used face-to-face interview for collecting my data. I avoided ‘participant observation’ 
because it is time consuming; and ‘focus group’ because participants may not be comfortable 
to discuss openly in the presence of the others, even in front of their own community 
participants.43 The researcher can choose between structured, semi-structured, non-directive, 
focused and informal interviews on the basis of the objectives of the research. I used semi-
structured interview with open ended questions because open-ended or uncoded questions do 
not constrain the respondent’s beliefs or opinions to predetermined categories.44 Furthermore, 
semi-structured interviewing technique is quite helpful to enrich data and to prevent potential 
                                                 
40  Silverman, David 2005: 255. Sited from Hammersley & Atkinson 1983.Thnography: Principles in Practice, 
London: Tavistock.  
41 Norman, M. Julie 2009: 73 
42 Rubin and Rubin 2005: 89 
43 There are two groups of indigenous people. One support peace accord and other don’t. Beside security 
intelligence also use indigenous people to collect information.  
44 Wilson, Michael 1996:101. Asking Questions in Sapsford, Roger & Jupp,Victor edition Data Collection and 
Analysis 
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constrains during the interview. In this regard, I benefited from semi-structured technique as I 
had the chance to add follow-up questions when something was not clear either for me or for 
the respondents. 
  
Interview place is very important for a stress-free interview and for ensuring the security of 
participants as well as the researcher. Usually in post-war communities it is very difficult to 
maintain trust. Even a respondent can be perceived as a spy, if the topic addresses some of 
the society’s most pressing social issues and policy questions.45Researcher’s presence in a 
community can create security problems for the respondents as well as the researcher.46 Jo 
Boyden stated that ‘area affected by conflicts is generally subject to complex governance 
arrangements in which military and security concerns are predominant.47 Indigenous people 
of CHT face severe delays, harassment, extortion and violence at various army checkpoints. 
For the security of the respondents as well as myself and to avoid unnecessary hassle both for 
me and respondents, I requested my respondents to travel to Khagrachari District town.  I 
used a meeting room, owned by the indigenous community for interviewing indigenous 
respondents. For Bengali respondents, I use a hotel meeting room, where I had been staying 
during my field work. Likewise in Rangamati District, I used a meeting room of indigenous 
NGOs for interviewing indigenous respondents and for Bengali respondents; I used the hotel 




I assembled secondary data both in English and Bengali from different sources that included 
published books, journal articles, research reports, government gazettes and laws, reports 
from UN and other international organizations, human rights groups, online correspondence, 
relevant newspaper articles and news published in the national dailies in Bangladesh from 




Before conducting the field work, I prepared an informed consent form including a brief 
explanation of the nature of the research, as well as providing an assurance of confidentiality 
and anonymity of the respondents. However none of the respondents demanded anonymity or 
confidentiality. Maintaining confidentiality is related with trust. Lincoln and Guba state that 
                                                 
45 Ger, Güliz and Sandikci, Özlem 2006: 511.   
46  Norman M. Julie 2009: 77 coded from Jacobsen and Landau. The Dual Imperative of Refugee Research  
47 Boyden, Jo. Anthropology Under Fire Ethics, Researchers and Children in War 
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‘‘trust is not established once and for all; it is fragile, and even trust that has been a long time 
building can be destroyed overnight in the face of an ill-advised action’’. 48 During the 
interview period, both with the Bengali and indigenous respondents, I clearly mentioned that 
I am interviewing both the community, but never disclose their opinions in fronts of other 
respondents. Within the whole data collection process and writing period, I was very much 




Recently, growing literatures find out the relationship between the natural resource and 
violent conflict and some studies are focusing on indigenous management of natural resource 
and conflict management. However, the study has been delimited the economical and 
environmental aspects in this study because these require other theories and analysis. Cultural 
aspect also has not been included in this study. My respondents were from six upazilla of 
Khagrachari and Rangamati Districts and I had not covered Bandarban District at all. Besides 
only three out of twelve ethnic groups were interviewed. It was not possible to cover all the 
ethnic groups due to time limitation; bad transport system and security reason. Though I got 
the number of filed cases by indigenous and Bengali community in the Rangamati Land 
Dispute Resolution Commission Office, Khagrachari Office has not provided the number of 
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
This chapter presents theoretical considerations which would keep this study focussed on 
indigenous rights, particularly indigenous land rights through establishing institutions in a 
post-war situation and recognizing and establishing customary rights of the indigenous 
people.  
 
Theorizing Indigenous Rights 
 
Over the last forty years, ‘Indigenous people’- become the subject of international law and 
focal point of anthropological research. The ‘term’ or ‘the concept’ emerged internationally 
with the Berlin Africa Conference of 1884-1885, convened by the Great Powers with the aim 
of agreeing on principles for the assertion and recognition of their territorial claims in Africa. 
On that conference, a commitment to the ‘protection of indigenous populations’ came out 
with the Article 6 of the Final Act of the Conference.49 The Members of the League of Nation 
accepted indigenous people as a ‘sacred trust of civilization’ and committed to promoting the 
well-being and development of the groups in accordance with Article 22 of the Convent of 
the League of Nations.50 In Americas, the term indigenous was used to identify marginalized 
ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups within state borders rather than the geographically 
marginalized group within the colonial territories. The Eighth International Conference of the 
American States, in its resolution XI of 21 December 1938 stated: 
 
‘‘That the indigenous populations, as descendants of the first inhabitants of the lands which 
today form America, and in order to offset the deficiency in their physical and intellectual 
development, have a preferential right to the protection of the public authorities’’.51 
 
The indigenous issue addressed formally by the United Nations System in 1949, when the 
General Assembly invited the Sub-Commission to study the condition of indigenous 
Americans in the hope that ‘the material and cultural development of these populations 
would result in a more profitable utilization of the resources of America to the advantage of 
                                                 
49 However the Great Powers used the term ‘indigenous’ to distinguish between the citizens of nationals of their 
countries and those persons in Africa who were under the colonial dominations. See details: Erni, Chritian (eds.) 
2008: 32 
50  The conceptual framework of the Article 22 was considered with both the colonial domination and 
institutional capacity. Considering the advanced character of South Africa in 1919, the League entrusted South 
Africa over the territory and population of Namibia. The League overlooked and did not conceive that in 
relation to recent Dutch and British settlers the populations of South Africa was itself indigenous. See details: 
Erni, Chritian  (eds.) 2008: 32 
51 Ibid 
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the world’.52 ILO Convention No. 107, Indigenous and Tribal Populations, in 1957 premises 
that the ‘social, economic or cultural situation [of indigenous people] hinders them from 
benefiting fully from the rights and advantages enjoyed by other elements of the population’ 
and from ‘sharing fully in the progress of the national community of which they form part’ 
and emphasized the ‘protection and integration’. The Convention obliges state parties to 
develop ‘co-ordinated and systematic action for their progressive integration’ through 
‘collaboration’ rather than ‘force or coercion’.53  
 
The 1971, ‘Barbados Declaration’ called for an engaged anthropology ‘which perceives the 
colonial situation [of indigenous people] and commits itself to the struggle for 
liberation….providing colonized people the data and interpretations both about themselves 
and their colonizers useful for their own fight for freedom’’ 54   The International NGO 
conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, held at Geneva in 
1977 emphasized ‘the right of indigenous people and nations to have authority over their own 
affairs’, and it set forth a draft declaration of principles calling for the recognition of 
indigenous people as subjects of international law. The World Conference to Combat Racism 
and Racial Discrimination, held at Geneva in 1978, ‘endorse[d] the right of indigenous 
peoples to maintain their traditional structure of economy and culture, including their own 
language’. ILO revised the Convention No. 107 after a strong criticism of the Convention as 
paternalistic and adopted the Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 1989.  
 
The Declaration of Rio on Environment and Development in 1992 stated that ‘‘indigenous 
people and their communities….have a vital role in environmental management and 
development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognise 
and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in 
the achievement of sustainable development.’’ With regard to the promotion and protection 
of indigenous people’ right, the United Nations declared as International Year (1993) and two 
successive International Decades (1995-2004 and 2005-2015) for Indigenous People. 
Establishment of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2000 was a remarkable 
advancement on the establishment of indigenous rights, which finally help the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous People by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The 
                                                 
52 General Assembly Resolution 275 (III), May 11 1949: Study of the Social Problems of the Aboriginal 
Populations and other Underdeveloped Social Group of the American Continent.  
53 Barsh, Russel Lawrence 1986: 370 
54 World Council of Churches, Programme to Combat Racism PCR 1/71 (E). Symposium on Inter-Ethnic 
Conflict in South America, meeting in Barbados, January 25-30 1971.  
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declaration stated, ‘‘indigenous people have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or 
as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of 
the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human 
rights law.55 International law now accepted that indigenous people enjoy collective rights to 
the ownership, control and management of their lands and territories; to the exercise of their 
customary laws; to represent themselves through their own representative institutions. It also 
recognised that laws, policies and development should not be imposed on them without their 
prior and informed consent.  
 
Land and Indigenous People 
 
With the concept of terra nullius,56 the European conquering powers acquired land and ruled 
over the aboriginal inhabitants. Europeans view that right over land are grounded in 
productive use of land as both Locke in his Second Treatise of Government and Emeric de 
Vattel in his The Law of Nations or the Principles of National Law of 1758 put the ideas. 
Vattel stated:  
 
The cultivation of the soil…….is ….an obligation imposed upon man by nature. Every nation 
is therefore bound by the law of nature to cultivate that land which has fallen to its share. 
There are others who, in order to avoid labour; seek to live upon their flocks and the fruits of 
the chase. Now that the human race has multiplied so greatly, it could not subsist if every 
people wished to live after that fashion. Those who still pursue this idle mode of life occupy 
more land than they would have need of under a system of honest labour, and they may not 
complain if other more industrious nations, too confined at home, should come and occupy 
part of their lands….[w]hen the nations of Europe come upon lands which the savages have 
no special need of, they may lawfully take possessions of them and establish colonies in 
them.57 
 
However, conquering powers since the Romans have recognized that native people should 
enjoy some measures of self-governance and the right to exercise their customary laws. 
Colonial laws also affirmed the principles that native people have the right to apply the 
customary law and represent themselves through their own institutions. In the 18th and 19th 
Centuries, the colonial powers deal with native people as ‘nations’ and signed treaties with 
them-often with the aim of cheating them out of their sovereignty and lands.58  
                                                 
55 Article 1, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
56 Identifying an area as terra nullius did not imply that there were no people in the area, but that territory was 
not possessed by a community having a social and political organization. 
57 Dodds, Susan 1998: 190 coded from Tully, ‘’Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle 
Ground’’. 
58 Colchester, Marcus 2002: 2 
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When British colonized India, they viewed vast tracts of Indian forests as impediments to the 
prosperity of the colonial exchequer. In 1855 they issued a memorandum titled “Charter of 
Indian Forests”, and create Forest Department in 1864. They passed the Indian Forest Act of 
1865, under which any land covered with trees or brushwood could be declared forest, and 
the government laid claim to it all. After thirteen years, they bring an amendment as the 
Forest Act of 1878. This version curtailed centuries-old, customary use right. The Forest Act 
of 1878 established that forest used by villagers was not a right but a privilege of concession 
given by the government.59  
 
After 1860, when the British took control of the Hill Tracts, the administration initiated a 
policy of curtailing the rights of the indigenous people to the forests and introduced two types 
of forest. By 1882-83, about one fourth (24 percent) of the total area of the Hill Tracts-1,244 
sq. miles became Reserved Forest. 60  However, the British has not totally abolished the 
traditional rights of the CHT indigenous people. They passed the CHT Regulation 1 of 1900 
(Bengal Act of 1900). This sought to identify, define and declare various customary rights 
and privileges for the CHT indigenous people. It has given the right to ‘occupy’ homestead 
land in rural areas61 and the right to use timber, bamboo and other ‘minor’ forest produces for 
bona fide domestic purposes.62 And the British taxation system in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
was based on the person and not on the land.63 R. H. Sneyd Hutchinson, who served as a 
Police Officer in CHT states that ‘‘this tax is a tribute payable to the State; it is no way 
partakes of the nature of rent, or bears any relation to the land cultivated.’’64 Bangladesh 
authorities considered indigenous people as ‘‘nomadic tribes people’ who were constantly on 
move and question about the traditional land rights. However, the myth is not correct. 
Hutchinson provides a detail description about the relationship between ‘juming’ and 
‘nomadism’ in the CHT. He states:   
  
‘‘Now as regards the supposed tendency of juming to encourage the nomadic habits of the 
Hill tribes, this is quite a mistaken idea. The very great majority of villages are permanent and 
have occupied their present site for a very large number of years. Take Bandarban for 
instance; this is the largest of the Hill villages and its population is entirely jumeah, but it has 
occupied its present site for more than 80 years and will continue to do so. The same may be 
said for all the principal villages.’’65 
                                                 
59 Mathur, Hari Mohan 2009: 173; Mitra, Kinsuk & Gupta, Radhika 2009: 195 
60 Roy, Rajkumari Chandra 2000: 69 
61 Rule 50 
62 Rule 41 A; Forest Act of 1927 
63 British administrative authorities were limited mainly with the indigenous institution, namely the chiefs or 
rajas and their head man to collect jum tax, which was paid annual basis. And no direct connection with land.  
64 Roy, Rajkumari Chandra 2000:57 coded from Hutchinson 1909:33.  
65 Roy, Rajkumari Chandra 2000:52 coded from Hutchinson 1906:51-54. 
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However, I am aiming to find out whether or not Indigenous people in the CHT have rights to 
claim their traditional land rights. Which they have used and occupied for centuries, 
including through juming, hunting-gathering and other traditional economic activities as 
Saami reindeer husbandry communities gained their traditional land rights?66  
 
ILO Convention No. 107 contains the first and to date the only binding standards on 
indigenous land rights. It recognizes ‘the right of ownership, collective or individual, of the 
members of the populations concerned over the lands which these populations traditionally 
occupy’ same time their customary laws regarding land use and inheritance and their right to 
be compensated in money or in kind for lands appropriated by the national government for 
development purpose.67 Ambassador José R. Martinez Cobo, in his Sub-Commission study of 
‘‘discrimination against indigenous populations’’ in the year 1983, concludes that 
‘‘indigenous people have a natural and inalienable right to keep the territories they possess 
and claim the lands which have been taken from them’’ and it processes detailed standards 
for the reconciliation of land rights.68 In the working group’s third session in 1984, on the 
governmental level Australia announced plans to give aboriginal communities ‘inalienable 
freehold title’ to traditional and sacred lands, with a veto over developments,69and Canada 
described its ongoing land claim process, emphasizing its view that settlements must be 
negotiated, ‘not imposed unilaterally’. In that session indigenous representatives jointly 
submitted a proposal, and the working group annexed this text without comment to its report; 
 
That the Working Group recongniz[e], as did the World Conference to Combat Racism and 
Racial Discrimination of 1978, ‘the special relationship of indigenous peoples to their land 
and…..that their land, land rights and natural resources should not be taken away from them’. 
Discovery, Conquest, and unilateral legislation are not legitimate bases for states to claim or 
retain the territories or natural resources of indigenous peoples. In no circumstances should 
indigenous peoples or groups be subjected to adverse discrimination with respect to their 
rights or claims to land, property or natural resources.70 
 
In the fourth session, Argentina Government described the loss by the Indians of their land 
and their lack of legal title to what they still occupied, and committed itself to recognizing 
                                                 
66 Swedish Supreme Court on 29 January 1981 rejected the governments claim that Saami people are nomadic 
and cannot acquire title to land. The Court state that Saami can acquire land by using for traditional Saami 
economic activities such as reindeer husbandry, hunting and fishing without engaging in settled farming or 
having a permanent dwelling.  
67 Barsh, Russel Lawrence 1986: 370 
68 Ibid: 371 
69 Ibid: 380. At the working group’s fourth session, aboriginal observers accused Australia of reneging on this 
commitment, on the basis of statements of the Government’s responsible minister that questioned the 
practicability of recognizing an aboriginal veto over mining. Australia assured the working group that the matter 
was still under review.  
70 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1984/WP.1.  
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and restoring ownership to them, ‘in accordance with their own organization and customs’. 
Mexico also emphasized on the need for land reform and warned against development 
programs that result in policies actually recognizable as ethnocide.  
 
Peace Agreement and Post-Accord Indigenous Land 
 
Rapid population growth, constantly changing climate conditions and absence of proper land 
policies makes this world a vulnerable place. And land conflict was a significant drive of 
social, political and environmental change throughout the 20th century. 71  Land conflict 
usually occurs when claims are grounded in formal state law versus informal or customary 
claims or where overlapping rights were granted to parties under different legal regimes or 
where overlapping and competitive rights have been granted to different parties for the same 
land.72 The struggle for land has also been identified as a source of internal strife in countries 
such as Bangladesh, the Philippines, South Africa and Israel and the precipitate factor of war 
between Senegal and Mauritania and El Salvador and Honduras.73 Land furthermore played a 
catalyst role in many secondary conflicts, such as in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Somalia and 
Iraq.74 Land is a critical element in peace-building and economic reconstruction in post-
conflict situations75as it plays the major role in respect to the return of refugees and IDPs, 
affecting both the choice of return and prospects for recovery.  
 
Usually a peace accord or treaty resolves a spatial contest in a macro sense, but often 
implementation of accord constitutes the re-establishment of tenure security, land registration 
and its administration (what they [still] mean and what not and how to use them) are 
complicated and hard to resolve.76 Concern about land and understanding about ownership, 
use and access to land for refugees and IDPs rarely incorporated sufficient analysis of the 
local land tenure situation. It is fair to say that land policy as an element of peace building 
mission, tends to be under-rated and has received little attention in the literature. Conflict 
over land often combines strong economic and emotional values,77 and often economics and 
political frequently mingle with other influences like law, public administration, and 
culture.78 ILO Convention No. 169 states that ‘land rights’ are the most important rights. 
                                                 
71 Simmons, Cynthia S. 2004: 183 
72 USAID 2005:3 
73 Simmons, Cynthia S. 2004; 183 
74 Molen, Paul van der and Lemmen, Christiaan 2004: 5 
75 USAID 2005: 2 
76 Unruh, Jon D.  2002 
77 OECD 2004 
78 USAID 2005: 3 
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Many of the current conflicts over land and territory relate to the possession, control, 
exploitation and use of natural resources. Even many countries, state itself keeps the right to 
control such resources and in numerous instances multinational corporations are asserting 
their own economic interests over them, unleashing complicated conflicts over ownership 
and use-rights with indigenous people. In Chile, one law recognises de rights of indigenous 
communities to their lands, but other laws allow any private party to claim possession of 
subsoil and water resources on them.79 In Mexico, the Zapatista uprising in 1994 put the issue 
of indigenous rights squarely on the national agenda and a peace agreement signed in 1996 
but still remained in paper. In 2001 governments passed a constitutional reform on 
indigenous issues that deviated from the agreements and further stalled the peace process. In 
Guatemala, Maya’s identity and rights were recognized by the peace agreement of 1996, but 
still access to land and resources remain the main problem of the indigenous community, 
though they constitute more than half of the national population. 80  In Afghanistan, 
establishment of a well functioning land administration and cadastre still a big challenge for 
the central government and international community. Government land appropriation and 
resettlement schemes can be also notorious for causing conflict and tension related to 
competition for land uses and claims, which we can find in the case of Bangladesh, Indonesia 
and Sri Lanka. Transmigration programme of the Bangladesh government in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts (CHT) had started in the Pakistan period, increased Bangali settlers from 26,000 
to 119,000 between 1951 and 1961. After the independence of Bangladesh, especially in the 
year 1979 and early 1980s, displaced another 100,000 jhumia people, and marginalised them 















                                                 
79 Stavenhagen, Rodolfo 2005: 2 
80 Ibid  
81 Roy, Raja Devasish 2004: 152 
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Chapter Four: History, Conflict and Land in CHT 
 
To situate the subject matter of the study, this chapter will discuss the state’s hegemonic 
approach 82  to the peoples of CHT. How successive British, Pakistan and Bangladeshi 
Governments’ rule have selectively overlooked, destroyed and changed the traditional rights 
of CHT people and some of the consequences of such discriminatory policies, are discussed 
in this chapter. Nation building issues both in the Pakistan (1947-1971) and Bangladesh 
period have formed in several direct and indirect ways the institutions, living conditions and 
rights of the people of CHT. Their response from the late 1970s onward was a politically led 
armed struggle for self determination. How the Government of Bangladesh reacted and used 
both massive coercive power and other “softer” means, in order to suppress the movement 
are to be highlighted in this chapter. The quite complicated, not much known (neither in 
media or in academic literature) fragile political negotiation process leading up to the signing 
of the Peace Accord in 1997 will finally be discussed. A short pre-colonial history is also 
given to understand the political situation before the British took over CHT. The role of this 
chapter in addressing the main topic of this thesis is to highlights the historical and political 
context which being used to suppress indigenous people movement and abolish their 
traditional land rights. 
 
Before the British colonial period, the history, which now termed the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
(CHT), is either incomplete or mostly inaccurate with the absence of dependable relevant 
sources. The Hill tribes moved in CHT mainly from Myanmar (earlier Burma), during the 
period from the 15th to 19th Centuries. The tribes belonging to the Kuki group were the 
earliest to settle and Chakmas came much later.83 Almost entire part of CHT was covered 
with dense forest. Shifting cultivation was the only agriculture practiced by tribal people to 
meet subsistence requirements. Cereals, oilseeds, vegetables and cotton were inter-cropped 
with the help of dibbles. Rice and Indian corn were the major cereal crops, while mustard and 
sesame (Sesamum indicum) were the major oil seeds cultivated for household consumption. 
                                                 
82  The concept of ‘hegemony’ has different meaning in different context. Generally it means a form of 
domination. It serves to impose the rules and enforcement that allows the inter-state system to function over 
time. Hegemony in the more generic sense, meant by Antonio Gramsci as the way in which a ruling group 
establishes and maintains its rule. The idea of hegemony presupposes that domination is built by giving 
concessions to the subordinated group. This accommodating approach enables the ruling class to transform the 
values and cognition of the subordinated group, split oppositional forces, and win consent from at least some 
fractions of the dominated group. Robinson, William I.2005: 560 
83 
Shelley, Mizanur Rahman 1992: 26 
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Cotton was produced to weave cloths for household use. 84  Mughal’s influence in CHT 
mainly started in 1666 and increased continuously. Chakma Rajas used Muslim name, such 
as, Rattan Khan (1673), Jalal Khan (1715-25), and Shermust Khan (1737-58). However, 
there is no clear evidence, whether they had been converted to Islam or only use Muslim 
name to keep the awesome Mughal power at the bay of Chakma. To meet some daily 
necessities e.g. dried fish, chicken, salt, tobacco, molasses, black cloth etc., which were not 
available in the Hills, Jalal Khan requested Mughal administrator of Chittagong to permit 
Bengali merchants to trade with the tribal people and voluntarily agreed to pay an annual 
cotton tribute to the Mughal authorities. And the entire area came to be known as the Kapas 
Mahal or the Cotton Area. In 1724, he refused to pay the tribute and consequently attacked 
and defeated by the Mughal Dewan, Kishan Chand, a Hindu. He had to flee to Arakan and 
died afterwards. By 1737, Shermust Khan yielded to the Mughal authority and a new 
administrative post designed as Dewan had been introduced in the Chakma tribal 
administration and continued up to 1900.85   
 
The British Period (1760-1947) 
 
By 1760, Bengal had come under control by the British East India Company. The region 
called the Hill Tracts was annexed after defeating the Chakma Raja Jan Box Khan and his 
general Ranu Khan Dewan in 1778. It shares boundaries with Indian states of Tripura to the 
north, Mizoram to the east, Chin and Rakhain states of Myanmar (Burma) to the south-east 
and south and to the west the Chittagong Districts of Bangladesh.86 A Peace Accord was 
signed by the Chakma Raja at Fort William, Calcutta, with the British Governor General 
Lord Cornwallis. The loosing party was forced to pay an annual tribute about 20 maunds of 
cotton to the British for the right to trade. This tribute was later extended to the indigenous 
Marmas also, the second largest indigenous group in CHT who migrated from Arakan. In the 
year 1789, the tribute was changed from cotton to cash and each married man had to pay Rs. 
3 or 4 annually.87 The changing tribute came as a burden for the diverse Hill population and 
to pay the taxes in cash Hillpeople dependent upon the Bengali traders88 who established 
                                                 
84
 Rasul, Golam & Thapa, Gopal B   
85 Shelley, Mizanur Rahman 1992: 27 
86 Roy, Rajkumari Chandra Kalindi 2000: 18 
87 Mohsin, Amena,1997: 80 coded from Mackenzie 
88 Before the British Rule, Chakma Raja also had to pay 11 maunds of cotton tribute to the Mughal to trade with 
the Bengali beparies (merchants). From that time Bengali controlled and manipulates the market. Often 
Hillpeople had to sell their products at nominal prices and often forced to borrow money with high interest, even 
sometimes 600 percent. Within in 1846 the HT revenue had risen from Rs. 5703.13 to Rs. 11803. Mohsin, 
Amena 1997: 80; Roy, Rajkumari Chandra 2000: 40; May, Wolfgang 1984: 79.  
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themselves as belonging to a superior status group. The British Crown took control over the 
CHT from the British East India Company after the Santal movement 89as the scale and 
brutality of the Rebellion became known to the native forces in 1857-1858.  
 
The Crown passed the Regulation Act No. XXII in 1860, which make CHT into a separate 
District. With the concept of terra nullius in 1864, the Crown rejected the claim of ownership 
of land by the native Chiefs and stated that ‘‘the chiefs of the CHT have no title to the 
ownership of the land which is vested exclusively in the Crown: they exercise only the 
delegated right of collecting taxes and rents on behalf of Government.’’90 In 1881, the British 
introduced territorial Chiefs/Rajas and divided the CHT into three so-called circles. An 
administrative officer was assigned for each circle under the Deputy Commissioner. With 
this the Circle Chiefs lost their power over all civil, criminal and juridical matters, except 
their authority to make rulings on so-called customary matters. To fullfil the huge demand for 
railway sleepers, which were being used to increase the railway network under construction 
within the vast territorial domain of British India, the Government declared 1356 square 
miles out of 5146 square miles as reserved forest. This area covered more than 25 percent of 
the total land of CHT.91 Restrictions were imposed on the native populations’ rights over 
their ancient region’s vast forest resources. This was done in the name of protection of forest, 
completely ignoring that these vast forests had been an integral part of their economic, social 
and cultural institutions and ways of live for many centuries.92 Another motivation behind the 
Britishers impositions was to bind the native people to start cultivation by plough instead of 
by fire and stick (Jum cultivation). Captain Thomas Herbert Lewin, the first Deputy 
Commissioner in the CHT stated; ‘‘introduction of the Reserve Forest Act for the prohibition 
of shifting cultivation (for) Hillpeople will influence plough cultivation.”93 The CHT Manual 
explicitly prohibited, restricted and regulated the migration of cultivating ravats (farmers) 
from one circle to another. The provision of Article 41 empowered the Deputy Commissioner 
to regulate and declare any area closeed to Jum cultivation and to restrict the expansion of 
                                                 
89 Bleie, Tone 2005: 107-112 
90 Mohsin, Amena 1997: 87 
91 Tripura, Sontosh Bikash 2008: 38 coded from R. H. Sneyd Hutchinson 1909:72-74 
92 Tripura, Sontosh Bikash 2008: 36-40, Mohsin, Amena 1997: 87, Mey, Wolfgang 1984. 95, Bleie, Tone 
2005:109 
93
 Tripura, Sontosh Bikash 2008: 41 coded from Lewin, Captain T.H. Wild races of south-eastern India1870, 
translated by Chakma, Bikash, Gyanendu 1998:20-24. Though the main objective was to introduce the plough 
cultivation to collect more revenue, it also helped to consolidate and enhance their political position. From the 
Jhum tax the chief received the 50 percent tax or Rs. 2 from each jhumia family and the rest 50 percent divided 
equally between headman and the British government. On the other hand, from the plough cultivation the local 
authority, chief and headman did not get any share, and it decreased the dependence of the state upon local 
functionaries (i.e. chiefs, headman and karbaries). 
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Jum cultivation to new territories, without giving any reason. The Regulation also destroyed 
the region’s ethnic and cultural diversity, by brining all the clans and tribal divisions under 
the control of three chiefs. The Manual did not have any provision whereby the local people 
or their representatives could formulate rules for themselves. The ancient category of 
common land was undermined. Rule 34 had left scope open for acquisition of land for 
various commercial and residential purposes.94 In most of the acquisition cases, Bengalis 
were claimants of the lands. Private land ownership was a new phenomena and created an 
incipient class of landowners who started using natives as day labourers in the changing Hill 
society. In early seventies about 10 percent of the region’s farmers owned more land than 
they could use for themselves.95 High quality forested or cleared land was given to European 
entrepreneurs for tea, coffee, orange and teak plantations.96 This critical and dramatic shift in 
land rights and management practices, eroded cohesion and solidarity in the tribal hill society, 
and undermined their egalitarian and redistributive norms and practices.97 
 
The Pakistan Period (1947-1971) 
 
CHT leadership failed to include CHT with India98 and the Bengal Boundary Commission 
headed by the Cyril Radcliffe awarded the CHT to Pakistan. 99  The CHT leadership 
vehemently opposed the annexation and hoisted Indian and Burmese flags in CHT. The 
Pakistan Government sent Baluch Regiment to lower the Indian Flag in Rangamati and 
Burmese Flag in Bandarban. Taking notice of these occurrences, the Pakistani leadership 
branded the Hillpeople as ‘pro-Indians’. Interestingly they were not accused for being ‘pro-
Burmese’. The Government of Pakistan started to administer CHT centrally from Lahore 
which was situated at a geographical distance. In 1956, the Pakistani Constitution gave CHT 
a special administrative status as an ‘Excluded Area’. Less than a decade later, in the year 
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1964, the Constitution was amended. The status of the CHT was changed from that of an 
‘Excluded Area’ to a ‘Tribal Area’. There were many such tribal areas in erstwhile West 
Pakistan. As part of the amendment, the Pakistan Government withdrew Rule 51 of the CHT 
Manual about the special provision of the authority of the District Commissioner to expel 
non-Hillpeople from the Hill region. Rule 34 was also amended and non-Hillpeople were 
now allowed to enter the Hill region and to live there to fifteen years.  
 
In the year 1953, the Government established Karnafuli Paper Mill in Chandraghona, 
presently under Rangamati District and created another category of forest called ‘Protected 
Forests (PF) in 1962, apart from two other forests created by the British to supplied bamboo 
and softwood lumber for the paper mill.100 The native Marma people were displaced from 
their forested realms and most of the new jobs in the new factories were taken by West 
Pakistanis and Bengalis. The Hillpeople composed only one percent of the workforce and 
occupied the lower-skilled positions only.101 The huge Kaptai Hydroelectric Project (1959-63) 
was established without any prior environmental or social impact assessment. There were no 
consultative or participatory measures involving the indigenous people in thus huge 
prestigious project at any stage of formulation or implementation. About 10,000 farming 
families including 8,000 Jhumia families, totalling more than 100,000 people, were displaced 
by the huge dam which flooded 54,000 acres of cultivable land.  About 40 percent of the total 
settled cultivable land of the District submerged by the dam.102 Though 280 million Rupees 
were allocated for the rehabilitation purposes, only 20 million Rupees were released for 
proper rehabilitation. 103 The government did not find enough land for rehabilitation and as a 
result large number of tribal, mostly Chakmas migrated over to the Indian states of Tripura. 
The Government also transferred all the local indigenous employees under District 
administration over to other Districts of East Pakistan by the mid-1960s. They were replaced 
by in-migrating Bengali officers who were charged with most offices including the education 
sector.104 Bengali became the medium of education. The Hillpeople, who spoke some ten 
languages, belonged to the Tibeto-Burmese language group and to the Indo-Aryan branch 
lost their rights to education in their own mother tongues.  
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The Bangladesh Period (1971- ) 
 
The Province of East Bengal of erstwhile Pakistan declared its independence on 26 March 
1971, setting in motion one of the bloodiest wars in the latter half of the 20th Century. The 
country was liberated on 16 December 1971, after a bloody war, involving intervention by 
India. During the liberation war, some Indigenous leaders supported the Pakistani regime.105 
Unfortunately, the all CHT’s Hillpeople were considered as ‘pro-Pakistani’ by Bangladesh 
authorities, in spite of the fact that the Pakistani regime themselves considered the CHT 
population ‘pro-Indians’. Following the hard-won independence of Bangladesh, the Mukti 
Bahini (Bengali Liberation Forces) raided houses and jungles of the CHT in search of 
Pakistani soldiers and collaborators allegedly hiding in the area. Many indigenous people 
were tortured and killed in those raids.106 The Mong Circle Chief and Charu Bikash Chakma 
appealed Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, asking him to stop this brutal violence in CHT. But the 
newly elected President and the Government treated the ensuing violence as natural in that 
volatile post-war situation of retribution and revenge.107  
 
This course of events and the attitudes of the newly elected leadership indicate that a severe 
process of alienation was set in force from the very early days of the new state. Sheikh Mujib 
also rejected the four points demands raised by the Manobendra Narayan Larma, a Member 
of Parliament from CHT. That were; autonomy for the CHT with its own legislature, 
retention of the 1900 CHT Manual, continuation of the offices of tribal chiefs and finally, 
provisions restricting the amendment of the CHT Manual and imposing a ban on the influx of 
non-tribal people into the CHT. Sheikh Mujib so to say asked the Hillpeople to forget about 
their century-long legacy as being a Hill realm with their separate legacies and identities the 
cross roads of South-Asia and South East Asian regions and become Bengalis. He backed his 
“advice” with a threat to effectively marginalize the Hillpeople by sending a massive wave of 
new Bengali migrants into the region.108 In the Constitution of Bangladesh (articles 3 and 6) 
only one language, Bengali and one Bengali nation are enshrined as the basis of the new 
nation. None of the other ethnic nationalities of Bangladesh who were citizens of the country 
were given any recognition.109Bangladesh, in order words, declared itself as a unicultural and 
unilingual nation state in a parliament session on the 23 of January 1974. After the 
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assassination of Mujib several amendments (described in greater details in Chapter six) were 
brought into the constitution. In 1979, the Government amended Rule 34 of the CHT Manual 
and opened CHT for unrestricted immigration and settlement for non-indigenous people form 
all over Bangladesh.  
 
According to one estimate around 400,000 Bengalis were settled in the CHT between 1979 
and 1984, displacing some 100,000 Hillpeople who were evicted from their ancestral 
lands.110 In 7th June 1988, through the eighth amendment of the constitution, Islam was 
declared as the state religion of Bangladesh. The ethnic minorities of Bangladesh who were 
both practising   Shamanism, Buddhism, popular Hinduism and Christianity  (mostly living 
in the north-western region and in CHT) found themselves to be minorities both in ethnic and 
religious sense111. 
 
The Vexed Issue of Cultural Nationalism 
 
The question of one national identity of Pakistan was a complex one, which motivated the 
movement of secessionism which lead to India and Pakistan in 1947. The Pakistani 
leadership brought the concept of ‘nation’ and ‘nation-state’ from the western political legacy, 
i.e. ‘a people living in a contiguous territory with the same ethnic origins, similar culture and 
above all one language’, but the Pakistani leaders from the Muslim League, attempted to 
construct a homogenous nation-state out of complex sub-societies that in most cases were 
heterogeneous in their composition.112 Keith Callard has pointed out; ‘‘it had hardly any 
history of national unity, people did not speak a common language, they did not have a 
homogenous culture; they did not even have a geographical or economic unit.’’113 Like Israel 
it is the only other state where religion played a crucial role in its creation, but while Judaism 
has helped integrate the identities of the multi-ethnic Jewish communities immigrating to the 
Israeli state, Islam failed to integrate the fissiparous tendencies of the state of Pakistan.114 The 
Pakistani leaderships formed elite political class largely belonged to West Pakistan. They did 
not have any root in the mass culture of Pakistan and ignored the demands for sharing 
economic and political power. They always reacted with selective coercion or bureaucratic 
persuasion but never by political accommodation. One can say that Pakistan was born with a 
shallow sense of national identity, developed as a reaction to militant Hindu nationalism, 
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which became less important, once the objectives of Pakistan was achieved and the external 
enemies of the Muslim nation (i.e. Hindus and the British colonialists) were removed from 
the embattled domestic political scene.115 Though Muslim League leadership, influenced by 
Allama Iqbal’s notion of ‘Muslim identity,’116 succeeded to mobilize the Muslim masses 
behind the slogan of Pakistan- a homeland for Muslims, they failed to create a real Islamic 
state in the Western ‘nation-state’ sense.117 A majority of the ‘ulama’ belonged to different 
Muslim sects and schools of thought, had even opposed the Pakistan movement on the 
grounds that nationalism and Islam were incompatible. The Quran does not permit political 
boundaries among the various groups of believers; it speaks of a united ‘nations’ or believers-
the millat or the umma. An individual who believes in the divine law of Allah-the Quran and 
owes allegiance to Allah and his prophet is a member of the millat, irrespective of his color, 
race, nationality, or citizenship. The Islamic nation does not have territorial limits, it is rather 
a Diaspora.118 The Muslim intelligentia did not make efforts to translate this ‘ideology’ into a 
concrete shape, spelling out the future economic, political, sociocultural and religious 
organization of the new Pakistan. Myron Weiner has pointed out, ‘‘The Westernized, largely 
non-religious leadership which led the preindependence movement was primarily concerned 
with creating a state with a Muslim majority, free from what they said would be the 
domination of the Hindu majority in India. They had no desire for an Islamic state’’.119 
 
During the post-independence era, the sustenance of Pakistan’s national identity and the 
process of national integration have stranded, as a result of immense regional-ethnic diversity 
and the shifting policies of Pakistani elites.120  The economic policies of various central 
Governments in Pakistan led to a sharp increase in regional and social disparity. Only 51 out 
of 741 top level policy-making positions (in East and West Pakistan) were occupied by 
Bengali Officers even nine years after the creation of Pakistan. Business, industrial and 
commercial entrepreneurs all were living in Panjab, Karachi and Lahore. 98 percent of the 
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officer corps in the army, navy and air force was occupied by the West Pakistanis. The 
Pakistan leadership had not taken into consideration the common British administrative 
strategy of how to rule in the region. British administration had established diverse 
administrative forms and mechanisms, varying from governor and chief commissioner of 
provinces to tribal territories and princely states. They divided and ruled the potentially 
troublesome parts of their vast Empire relatively successfully for long periods. Furthermore, 
fearing Muslim revivalism in the predominantly Muslim area, they encouraged the growth of 
ethnic identities.121 Such policies created inter-cultural alienation and inter-ethnic animosities 
by hindering the development of tendencies towards integration, unity and cohesion.122  
 
The Pakistani leadership taken for granted that the religious national identity of being a 
muslim would always prevail in all situations, but it proved to the contrary in the elections of 
East Pakistan in 1954 and in the elections in both wings in 1970. In the 1970 elections, 
Awami League won with an overwhelmingly majority (160 seats out of 300), on the basis of 
regional autonomy in the East Wing and in the West, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) won 
an absolute majority (81 seats out of 300) on a socialist program. The right wing political 
parties which emphasized Islam as the bond of unity and which went to the polls with 
programs based on ‘Islamic Ideology’ performed miserably.123 The seeds of secular Bengali 
nationalism mainly started to grow in 1950s, when the Central Government dismissed the 
United Front Government, which came power through the 1954 election. Even the Pakistani 
leadership believed that Bengalis were converted from the low cast Hindus and were still 
under their cultural influence; Bangla language written in Nagri script, similar to that of 
Sankrit was identified with Hinduism. The Pakistani leadership decided to have a common 
language as one of the bases of its nationhood. In 1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah declared in 
Dhaka:  
 
Let me make it very clear to you that the state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and 
no other language….Without one state language no nation can remain tied up solidly together 
and function. 
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A religious orientation to the same was given by the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat 
Ali Khan in 1949. He stated: ….the defense of Bengali language in front of Urdu, is against 
the laws of Islam. The Central Minister for Education openly proposed the introduction of 
Arabic script for Bengali.124 The interesting thing is that about 14 percent people speak Urdu 
in West Pakistan. The Pakistani leadership was not sure how to interpret Islamic ideology, 
what does it really mean? Islamic ideology was a vague.125 In 1952, Pakistani authorities 
open fire on students in Dacca, who were protesting the imposition of Urdu as the sole 
national language. Four people killed in the protest and they instantly become national heroes, 
and 21 February henceforward became a day of national glory and forerunner to Bengali 
nationalist movements.126 Through the language movement Bengali nationalism acquired a 
secular and cultural form as language and culture replaced religion as the basis of their 
identity. It was a construction, in which the Hillpeople of CHT had no space, as they do not 
speak Bangla and culturally different from the Bengalis. In 1954 national elections, a 
Chakma leader, Kamini Mohan Dewan elected Member of Parliament, as an independent 
candidate from CHT, without any association with the United Front. The Hillpeople of CHT 
were also not included in the Awami League’s Six Point program in the 1966. During this 
entire period, neither the Awami League leadership attempts to incorporate the Hillpeople in 
the movement nor any CHT leadership tried to associate them in the new development. 
Hillpeople considered the movement as a political struggle between the Bengalis and West 
Pakistanis. In the 1970 elections Awami League candidate, Charoo Bikash Chakma defeated 
by the independent candidate, Chakma Raja Tri Dev Roy. Of the two seats Awami League 
could not win in 1970 elections in East Bengal, CHT was one of them. CHT leadership was 
totally indifferent towards these developments and were not part of any brands of nationalism, 
which was developing in East and West Pakistan.127  
 
The Pakistani leadership chose the dominant community to be the model of nation, while the 
sub-ordinate or minority communities were expected to assimilate themselves with the 
dominant or mainstream. During the Ayub era, instead bureaucracy, army became the 
symbols of Western domination over the East. The West Pakistan leadership tried to manage 
the East Pakistan crisis in military means, resulted 30, 00,000 people dead and thousand of 
women being raped. Attempts are also being made by the sub-ordinate communities to 
challenge the dominant view of nationhood. Which we can see in the case of ‘Jumma Nation’ 
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building in Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh.128 The refusal of accept the Hillpeople as a 
separate identity seeds the notion of Jumma nationalism-an identity and singlled the formal 
break of the CHT from the state sponsored model of nationhood with the formation of 
PCJSS.129 Mujib did the same wrong as Jinnah had sown the seeds of Bangali Nationalism by 
imposing Urdu language upon the Bengalis. M. N. Larma, a Parliament Member refused to 
endorse the 1972 Bangladesh Constitution, [Article 9 defined the basis of state nationalism as 
Bengali nationalism] by arguing:  
 
‘‘You can not impose your national identity on others. I am a chakma not a Bengali. I am a 
citizen of Bangladesh, Bangladeshi. You are also a Bangladeshi but your national identity is 
Bengali……They [Hillpeople] can never become Bengali’’.130 
 
In an electoral speech at Rangamati in 1973 Mujib declared from today onward the tribals are 
being promoted into Bengalis. However, this notion was strongly rejected by the Hillpeople. 
The PCJSS wishes to achieve ‘Jumma’ identity based more on social-political than on 
cultural characteristics. During the post-independence period, Bangladesh suffered from an 
ideological differentiation as opposed to ethnic differentiation. A homogeneous Bengali 
identity did not prove to be a potent tool for coping with post-independence problems. 
Rashiduzzaman pointed out, ‘‘Bengalis demonstrated a separatist nationalism fed by the 
economic grievances against Federal Government…..But Bengali leader failed to develop 
any sound political organization’’. Anti-Indian feelings had led to change in the emphasis on 
secularism even during Mujib’s regime. After Mujib assassination, particularly under the 
General Zia regime, the Islamic ideology and identity have been reinstated. The move 
towards islamisation was obviously aimed at appeasing the dominant majority community of 
the state and to secure the support from military.131 General Zia formed the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP) to run in the election. The BNP election manifesto defines 
Bangladeshi nationalism as: 
 
Religious belief and love for religion are a great and imperishable characteristic of the 
Bangladeshi nation…the vast majority of our people are followers of Islam. The fact is well-
reflected and manifest in our stable and liberal national life.132 
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Bangladeshi nationalism draws a territorial line between Bengalis of Bangladeshi and 
Bengalis of West Bengal, India. Bangladeshi nationalism as it evolved in 1975 was, in 
essence, a reassertion of the Muslim identity of the Bengalis in Bangladesh. Islamic ideals 
were incorporated into the Constitution. Bismillahir-Rahmanir-Rahim (In the name of Allah, 
the Beneficent, the Merciful) was inserted at the beginning of the constitution by the 
proclamation of Order No. 1 of 1977. The principle of secularism was dropped from the 
constitution. Ministry of Religion was established and religious studies made compulsory in 
all schools.133 Thus the new model of nationhood thereby bred two kinds of communalism, 
religious as well nationalistic. There was no space for accommodating the Hillpeople of CHT 
in this new construction. After the murder of Zia, General H.M. Ershad moved towards a 
more straightforward ‘Islamic nationalism’. Islam was declared as the state religion of 
Bangladesh. Religion as well as culture was being used as tools of domination in minority as 
well as for the CHT people. Historical experience helped PCJSS to build Jumma identity as 
the Hillpeople share unique historical experience beleaguered by outsiders and being stressed 
by the possession of a Jumma homeland. They lost their land to the British and subsequently 
by the Bengalis.134  PCJSS described in 1987: 
 
‘‘The Chittagong Hill Tracts is the homeland of ten linguistically different Jatis (nation alities 
or communities): the Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Bawn, Lushai, Mru, Pankho, Khumi, Khyang 
and the Chak. For centuries, these ten linguistically different Jatis have inhabited CHT and 
maintain their own communities, culture and language. Every nation in the world, either big 
or small, tries its best to uphold its national identity and solidarity. The ten linguistically 
different Jumma people of CHT are no exception to this’’.135 
 
As a social identity it distinguishes the Hillpeople from Bengalis and others. As a political 
identity it claims certain rights, ‘provincial autonomy’ of the Hill Tracts and resource rights. 
PCJSS always avoided taking the indigenous identity. First of all, PCJSS had been 
attempting to create a common identity of Jumma for Hillpeople, who differ in ethnicity, 
language and religion and an ideology of indignity would undermine their efforts. Second, 
Jumma identity had been popularized and familiarized since 1970s. Third, the Bengali 
acronym of the term indigenous is Adivasis, which literally means ‘first inhabitants’ and is 
generally used to refer to the plain land ‘tribes’ such as Santals, Mounda and so forth, who 
are said to have been the descendants of ‘pure Dravidian’ stocks but Jumma are not.136 There 
are also various obstacles to the acceptance of Jumma nationalism. First, Jumma identity will 
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have to compete with distinct local group identities, that are well established and do not have 
shown sign of fading. Second, acceptation of the Jumma identity depends on the degree to 
which old inter-group perceptions can be neutralized. Marmas and Tripuras argue that 
Jumma is a Chakma word and since the PCJSS is overwhelmingly a Chakma dominated 
institution, so there exists the very real fear of Chakma hegemony in this construction 
itself. 137  Bangladesh Government either ignore the Jumma identity or denounce it as a 
figment of the imagination of some mis-guided chakma ‘miscreants’, who try to disturb 
peaceful relations between Bengalis and Hillpeople by means of illegal organization. 138 
 
Militarization of CHT 
 
Militarization of CHT mainly started in the early year of the British rule. British established a 
para-military unit to guard the eastern frontier and to curb arms smuggling in their new 
‘Chittagong Hill Tracts District’. In 1870s, there was one military policeman for every 96 
inhabitants of the Hills. 139  After partition, Pakistan Government deployed the Baluch 
Regiment to crush the local resistance (discussed earlier in this chapter) and in 1948 
disbanded the Frontier Police Force. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA also used 
the CHT until 1962 Sino-Indian border war, to covert operations against Chinese’s authority 
in Tibet, with the help of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. Z. Phizo’s Naga 
National Army also operated its insurgency against Delhi’s authority. Mizo also received 
assistance to operate from remote CHT bases at Ramu, Bolipara, Mowdak and Thanchi. In 
1969 when Awami League back down from its autonomy plan, CHT port became busy for 
servicing military troops. In March 1971, President Yahya Khan postponed the National 
Assembly for an indefinite period and decided to crush the autonomy movement of East 
Bengal by military power.140 After the Independence of Bangladesh, indigenous leadership 
demanded for regional autonomy of CHT within the state of Bangladesh. Unfortunately, 
Bangladesh leadership interpreted the Hillpeoples’ demand as secessionist and identified the 
CHT as a ‘national security’ problem. After the refusal, CHT leader, Larma established the 
political party PCJSS and its’ military wing Santi Bahini (Peace Force). To break the tribal 
insurgency Government has sent the 24th Infantry Division, and consequently the CHT has 
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undergone full scale of militarization, and military has been given total control of civil 
administration.141  
 
Amnesty International states that in 1980 between 20,000 and 100,000 armed personnel were 
active in the Hill tracts.142There are four Brigade Head Quarters in the CHT: Rangamati, 
Khagrachari, Dighinala and Bandarban and two Garrison in Ramu and Alikadam. Besides 
there is army base camp in each Upazilla and road side and naval base in Kaptai and anti-
guerrilla training centre at Mahalchari. 143  Chairmanship of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Development Board (CHTDB) was given to the General Officer Commanding (G.O.C) of 
Chittagong Cantonment, who holds all military commands in the CHT. CHTDB has given 
charge for all kinds of development, including controlling the international aid. However, it is 
found that about 80 percent of the CHTDB development budget spent on building military 
infrastructure through construction of military camps, roads and bridges, office building, 
mosques, cluster villages both for Bengali settlers and Hillpeople. Two hundred camps have 
been withdrawn from different phases after the 1997 CHT Peace Accord.  The present AL 
Government has withdrawn one brigade of troops and 35 temporary security camps from 
CHT areas and decided to shift Kaptai and Rangamati brigade to the Chittagong Cantonment. 
Furthermore government also promised that other camps will be shifted gradually.144 
 
Land Conflict and CHT  
 
Although CHT leadership demanded self rule of CHT for more than half a century, the issue 
of land as a separate issue, or as a key issue is not even noticeable up to the 1980s, and came 
noticeable when JSS submitted five-points demand to the Bangladesh Government, included 
a demand for the removal of all Bangali settlers who had been settled in the region since 
1947.145 Unruh mentioned that even conflict that had no land component initially can lead to 
tenure problems in the peace process, due to the spatial nature of both land tenure and armed 
combat.146 Nowadays, Indigenous leaderships in CHT often mention that land is the main 
problem in the CHT. The land scarcity in CHT mainly started during the British colonial 
period. Nearly the whole region in theory, if not practice, is considered forest and property of 
the state. Following the Indian Forest Act of 1865, most of CHT was declared as forest in 
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1872 (5670 square miles out of 6682 square miles) and was divided into ‘Reserved Forest’ 
(RFs), under the Forest Department and ‘Unclassed State Forest’ (USFs) or District Forest, 
under the Deputy Commissioner’s management. Though indigenous people had the right to 
use USF or District Forest for swidden/Jum cultivation with the permission of DC but they 
lost their rights to use RF resources. According to some accounts RFs accounted for about 
one fourth of the total area of CHT by the 1880s.147 During the Pakistan period, a third 
category of forest called ‘Protected Forest’ was introduced and temporally forbidden for 
Jhum cultivation under development schemes. Major land crisis occurred when Kaptai Dam 
or Kaptai Hydro-Electric Project (1959-63), had been constructed by the Government of 
Pakistan. This scheme flooded 54,000 acres-nearly forty percent of the most excellent 
agricultural land, and relocated about 18,000 jhumia families. Many of them flew in the 
nearby Arunachal Pradesh of India, where they remain as stateless refugees, under constant 
threat of eviction.148 After Independence, the Government of Bangladesh has followed the 
same tradition in extending the forest department’s control in CHT, as well as leasing and 
acquiring forest lands for Bengali and Jumma settlement, commercial plantations, 
development and so on.149 In the year 1979, the Government of Bangladesh amended Rule 34 
of the Regulation 1 of 1900150 and stated that ‘‘land for residential purposes may be settled 
by the DC with deserving persons on a long term lease basis {(Rule 34 (d) (1)}. From 1979-
1984, about 400,000 Bangalis were sent to the CHT, under the sponsorship of Governments’ 
resettlements schemes in exchange for land (for each family: Paddy land 2.5 acres, Plain and 
Bumpy Mixed 4.0 acres and Hilly land 5.0 acres), cash and other incentives.151 With the 
figures of table 2 and 4, we can say that large scale migration programme changes the 
demographic situation of CHT and marginalizes the Hillpeople in their own land both in 
number and religiously. Table 3 shows twenty two percent land of CHT was available for 
agricultural and forestry purpose. Out of them, only three percent land was suitable for ‘all-
purpose agriculture’, below three percent for terrace agriculture and about 15 percent for 
horticulture and partly for forestry. Bengali population was only acquainted with plough 
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cultivation. If someone calculates,152 it is easily understandable that without grabbing the 
lands of the indigenous people it was not possible to carry out the settlement programme as 
there was simply not enough land to settle Bengalis in the CHT.  
 
Table 02: Estimates of Hillpeople and Non-Hill population in the CHT  
 
 Hillpeople Non-Hillpeople 
Year Number % Number % 
1872 61957 98.26 1097 1.74 
1901 116063 92.98 8762 7.02 
1951 261538 90.91 26150 9.09 
1961 335069 87.01 50010 12.99 
1974 409571 80.59 98628 19.41 
1981 455000 61.07 290000 38.93 
1991 501144 51.43 473301 48.57 
2001*     
 
Source: Adnan, Shapan 2004: 57 
 
* Curiously the 2001 census does not provide a figure categorising the Hillpeople and 
Bengalis in the CHT 
 
 
Table 03: Soil Types and Land Use Potential in CHT (According to the Forestal Study of 
1964-66). 
 
Area Types of Soil and Land use ‘Class’ of 
Lands Acres % 
All-Purpose Agriculture A 76466 3.07 
Terrace Agriculture B 67871 2.72 
Mostly Horticulture & Partly Forestry C 366622 14.71 
Only Forestry D 1816993 72.91 
Horticulture & Forestry CD 32024 1.28 
Settlement  653 0.03 
Water Bodies  131637 5.28 
Total  2492266 100.00 
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 1951 1961 1974 1981 1991 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Buddhists 215000 74.84 275681 71.59 337586 66.47 394321 52.46 425311 43.65 
Muslims 18070 6.29 45322 11.77 95633 18.83 259568 34.53 429954 44.12 
Hindus 40984 14.27 47644 12.37 53373 10.51 70583 9.39 87806 9.01 
Christians 3745 1.30 10160 2.64 13272 2.61 18973 2.52 22206 2.28 
Others 9475 3.30 6272 1.63 8050 1.58 8247 1.10 9168 0.94 
 
Source: Adnan, Shapan 2004: 60  
 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord of 1997 
 
In 1997 the Government of Bangladesh signed a peace accord, the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Peace Accord (CHT Peace Accord), with the representatives of the indigenous people. The 
Accord was the outcome of the long negotiation process primarily initiated by the 
Government of Bangladesh. During 1970s, CHT was sealed off from the outside world. 
However, in 1980s, massive human rights violation, massacres of jumma people, burning 
villages, disappearances, detention without trial, rape, torture, forced relocation news came 
out for the outside world, when a large number of jumma people fled into the state of Tripura, 
India. And the conflict gets international attention. In 1977, a Committee under the auspices 
of the Tribal Convention was formed to intercede between the Government and the PCJSS, 
however the efforts were disrupted due to internal strictures within the PCJSS and the murder 
of President Ziaur Rahman in 1981.153International donors pressured the Government to 
reach in a political settlement. Amnesty International has published regular news of human 
rights violation in CHT. The CHT Commission (earlier based on Netherland), has published 
annual reports on the situation and provide information to the donors, such as Japan, the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, France, Germany, Switzerland, the European 
Commission (EC) and the United States of America. 154  During the Ershad Government 
period, a series of dialogue took place between 1985 to 1988, with the PCJSS and the 
Government. Earshad declared general amnesty. A breakaway faction of the PCJSS, head by 
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Priti Kumar Chakma surrendered with some 300 Santi Bahini soldiers.  From 1983 to 1991, a 
total of 2574 Santi Bahini soldiers surrendered.155 BNP Government, which came into power 
in 1991, formed a multi party committee in 1992, with two Parliament Member from AL, 
four from BNP, one from Jamaat-e-Islami and one from Workers Party. This committee met 
13 times with the PCJSS, but failed to reach an agreement, as differences existed between the 
Government and the PCJSS on the question of political autonomy for CHT and Bengali 
settlers issue.156 In 1996, when Awami League Government came into power, Prime Minister 
Sheikh Hasina requested India to withdraw its support from the PCJSS 157 . A National 
Committee on CHT set up in October 1996 to reinitiate the peace process. With the backing 
of India, the National Committee of CHT negotiated with the PCJSS and concluded with the 
signing of a Peace Accord between the National Committee and the PCJSS.158 An important 
but largely unexplored dimension of the negotiation process was the little known pre-formal 
exchange of messages between the parties that has led some to believe that ‘‘agreed to agree, 
whatever the contents of the accord might be’’.  
 
There was no third party (other than a liaison agent) during the negotiation time. The 
Government of Bangladesh categorically rejected the third party mediation. 159  A 
Government-imposed news blackout and localization of the conflict within the CHT, kept the 
Bengali population outside the region unaffected and largely unaware of the issue. The 
Accord vehemently protested by the main opposition Party, BNP and others political parties. 
BNP submitted 18 points claim about the Accord.160 BNP Chairperson, Khaleda Zia claimed 
that the Accord would set up a parallel Government in the country and urged Prime Minister 
to scrap it.161 Late Mannan Bhuiyan, the then General Secretary of BNP strongly criticised 
the Government and questioned about the fate of the Accord. 162 Even the PCJSS had not 
made any attempt to incorporate the Pahari Chatra Parishad (PCP, or Hill Student’s Forum), 
the Pahari Gono Parishad (PGP, or Hillpeople’s Council) and the Hill Women’s Federation 
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(HWF), though they carried out the movement in democratic manner by networking Bengali 
women’s organizations and student forums both within the CHT and other parts of 
Bangladesh.163 Sheikh Hasina won the UNESCO Peace Prize in 1999 for the accord.  
 
Chapter Summary  
 
The above discussions highlight the state hegemonic aspects and its impact on CHT people. 
The British destroyed the traditional rights of the Indigenous people and alienated them from 
indigenous system. For their own economic and administrative benefit they introduced 
private land ownership system, and make a class system in the society. In the beginning of 
their rule, British has faced resistence from the indigenous groups and used ‘‘divide and 
rule’’ mechanism to suppress the nationalism movement of the indigenous people. After the 
partition of British India, indigenous people gradually marginalised, alinated and 
exterminated in the ‘nation-state’ building process of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Though they 
geographically belong to East Bengal and later Bangladesh, they were not incorporated either 
Bengali or Bangladeshi nationalism process. The state’s administrative, developmental and 
military encroachment into the CHT, which resulted from the nation-state building strategies 
that both the Pakistan and Bangladesh pursued, slowly led the indigenous people towards 
marginalization in their own ansestral lands, make them more vulnerable in economically  
and culturally poor. The failure of the constitutional recognition of indigenous identities in 
1972, led to the struggle for autonomy in the CHT, and aimed to preserve a separate identity 
for the Hillpeople. ‘Jumma identity’ building movement starts with a bid for ethnic 
innovation, to cope with the political and economic consequence of loss of power, growing 
expendability to the state and cultural marginalization. However, it is a concern how this new 
identity will shape in future and whether it would be able to supress the old ethnic identities. 
 
In the next chapter I will discuss about the challenges of institution building in Bangladesh as 







                                                 
163 Mohsin, Amena, 2003: 15 
  40  
Chapter Five: Analytical Framework 
 
This chapter deals with the challenges which Bangladesh as a post-war state face, in 
establishing democratic institutions and particularly indigenous institutions in order to bring 
justice and peace a disputed sub-region, where people rights have been violated and 
neglected  through state mechanisms and policies. How a specially mandated institution like 
the Land Dispute Resolution Commission can make its activities responsive to both a diverse 
constituency of indigenous people without ignoring the many Bengali migrants and all the 
same gain trust and ownership among the Hillpeople, will be given attention.  
 
Post War Institution Building and Indigenous Institution Building 
 
War breaks the social fabric, deepens ethnic divisions and conflict among communities, 
resulting deaths of people, displacing thousands and destroying the basis for the functioning 
of institutions. Lack of institutional capacity hinders a society’s ability to restore and 
maintain peace.164 This may be one of the main reasons why the majority of post conflict 
countries experience a return to conflict within 10 years in spite of all the efforts to promote 
peace. Presently, an increasing emphasis has been placed on the crucial role of institutional 
development in preventing the renewal of conflict. Secretary-General underlines in his 2009 
report that institution building should be starting immediately aftermath of conflict. In 21 
January 2011, The Security Council convened an open debate considering the importance of 
institution-building as part of a comprehensive approach to peace building in countries 
recovering from conflict and on the road to sustainable peace.165 Institutions play a critical 
role in settlements negotiated to end civil wars. Many scholars suggest forming alternative 
political institutions to manage conflict within divided societies and these institutions could 
be divided into electoral, territorial and administrative categories.166Harvey Waterman has 
noted, ‘‘civil wars [often] end in a deal and that…..deal is about political institutions.167 
Institutions, broadly defined as rules of competition and serve to facilitate social interaction 
by reducing uncertainty regarding the regulation of human behaviour.168 Unfortunately, most 
of the peace and development intervention in recent decades has been entirely antithetical to 
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indigenous and traditional practices, regarding them as unaccountable, opaque and 
contradictory to the ‘enlightened’ intentions of liberal peace and internationally sponsored 
post-war reconstruction efforts. The ‘liberal peace’ or ‘Western peace’ effectively minimizes 
the space available for indigenous and traditional approaches to be peace-making.169  
 
Political autonomy and later, national sovereignty, has played an important role in the 
emergence of Bangladesh, and still continues to do so for many people in Bangladesh. After 
the hard-won independence in 1971, Bangladesh has faced numerical challenges in building 
democratic institution and solving national identity issues. Immediately, after independence, 
the country went under military rule and continued until 1990. Military rulers have suspended 
the constitution for several years and brought many amendments in the constitution to 
legalise their rule. They tried to reshape the identity issue in a geographical and religious 
format without considering the minorities and their religious believes and culture. To remain 
in power, they used electoral corruption and allowed corruption in every section. The 
democratic governments which come into power after the military rule make policies often 
aim to make the democratic and right based institutions feeble. The following paragraph, 
presents the current situation of some democratic and right based institutions of Bangladesh.  
 
Bangladesh Election Commission now has an independent Secretariat with its own training 
institute, but still has to depend on government about budgetary and manpower issues. 
Another contested and often politicised issue is the appointment of election commissioners. 
Article 118 (1) provides that the appointment of the chief election commissioner and other 
election commissioners shall, subject to the provisions of law made in that behalf, be made 
by the president. No laws have been made, as provided by the constitution. So there is a 
chance of undue government‘s influence over appointments of commissioners. The Anti 
Corruption Commission (ACC), which started its’ journey in 1947 has been restructured a 
number of times before it got its present independent, self-governed and neutral shape on 23 
February 2004.170 During this long existence, it has largely been effective.171 In the period of 
last Caretaker Government (2007-2008) the Commission got some degree of dynamism and 
vibrancy. On April 26, 2010, the present government approved an amendment of the Anti-
corruption Commission Act 2004, which incorporated provisions, which obliged the 
Commission to take government permission before filing graft cases against bureaucrats. 
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This amendment made the ACC accountable to the President, introducing penalties for filing 
false cases and specifying that the appointment of ACC secretary should be undertaken by 
the government. Another problem is that Commission has no constitutional base. It has been 
created by an act of the Parliament.172 The government of Bangladesh also passed the ‘Right 
To Information Act’ in 2009 and formed the Information Commission. The Commission has 
been authorised to issue directives and guidelines, including, ‘regulations’ to guide and direct 
‘authorities’ in preparing  and publishing lists of information that would be available free of 
cost.173 For its effective implementation, first of all, strong political commitment needed. A 
time bound strategic framework should be developed with participation of civil society, 
NGOs, media and implementation bodies. Appointment of the Commissioner must be made 
with the highest degree of credibility, public trust, professional excellence and capacity, 
leadership quality and dynamism. Training will help the service officers to cope with the 
relatively unknown professional expertise and came out from the secrecy mindset. A massive 
public awareness programme needed to fulfill its objectives. Government has appointed three 
Commissioners, including Chief Information Commissioner. There is also an allegation about 
the appointees are somehow linked with politics. In the data collection period, CHT Land 
Dispute Resolution Commission has denied giving my required information. Even they have 
not told me the number of cases that they receipt for land dispute resolution. In the future, 
how policy will develop and mass people get its’ fruit is a big question. The National Human 
Rights Commission (NHRC) was formed on 1st September 2008 to play a significant role in 
establishing a culture of respect for human rights with the co-operation of all concerned, 
including the civil society, the public and private organizations. NHRC has the power to 
investigate, but no authority to summon, subpoena, or sanction anybody. It has no own 
investigators and no power to prosecute alleged wrongdoers. This short overview over a 
number of supposedly important “watchdog” institutions in Bangladesh, suggest there is a 
general tendency of disabling such potentially democratic and human rights promoting 
institutions by the political parties which formed government respectively.  
 
The Accord promised semi-autonomy for the CHT by creating institutions and mere transfer 
of administrative powers to regional bodies by reducing the ‘self-government agencies’ to a 
sort of peripheral branch of the state administration, subordinated to carry out decisions taken 
at the centre. Three Hill District Councils (HDC) were strengthened with increasing the 
number of governance areas under its jurisdiction, adding law and order, secondary education, 
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land administration and developmental matters within its authority. The Accord also 
signalled an intent to enhancing the authority to be exercised by the HDCs over its 
‘transferred subjects’, including enhancing its legislative prerogatives. The HDC 
Amendments Act of 1998 provided that no lands within the Hill Districts were to be settled, 
leased out, transferred or compulsorily acquired by the GOB without the consent of the HDC 
concerned (Clause 29 (1) Ka). The new governance areas have not been transferred through 
the execution of inter-departmental agreements and memoranda of understanding 
(MOU).The HDCs were to be provided land revenue incomes from their respective Districts, 
and to have transferred authority over lower level land administration officials (Clause 29 (2) 
(both indigenous institutions like the headmen and revenue officials of the GOB). Even so, 
this provision too is yet to be acted upon. A related provision stated that the HDCs were to 
receive a part of the royalty from the GOB’s incomes from extraction of forest produce and 
the extraction of mineral resources. In this instance too, no corresponding legislation or other 
executive measures have been put in place. The HDCs have as yet to gain a role in national 
decision-making processes regarding the allocation of funds for development-related projects. 
Theoretically, the HDCs have been authorized to frame regulate various decision-making 
processes, and to be consulted by the GOB before any rules are passed by the GOB under the 
HDC Acts of 1989 (and amendments made thereto in 1998).  The HDC should have been 
capacitated to formally request the GOB to refrain from passing any laws that may be 
detrimental to the interest of the “tribal” people of the Hills. As already noted, its legislative 
prerogatives remain largely untested.174 Since the formation of HDC, CHT people have not 
given chance to choose the representatives of the HDC, those in turn are supposed to be 
electing the Regional Council. The political parties, which form the government, appointed 
their party affiliated candidates as chairman of HDCs.  
 
The Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) demanded a Regional Council (RC) 
with legislative and administrative power with the hope that it will restore some of the 
control over the Hill area, thus contributing to fulfil the right to self determination, a right 
whose importance in the international indigenous rights’ discourse has increased 
tremendously in recent years. The functioning of the Regional Council is one of the primary 
pre-conditions for any progress in the implementation of the Accord. Moreover, the GOB 
was obliged to consult the RC before passing any laws that were made applicable to the CHT. 
A related provision of the Accord stipulates that the RC could advise the GOB to remove any 
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inconsistencies between the CHT Accord and the CHT Regulation of 1900, which as already 
stressed is the main legal instrument under which the region is administered. Authority over 
the police, law and order, strengthening of the role of the Hill District Councils in fiscal 
policy-making and related matters and the transfer of executive authority to the CHT 
Regional Council is yet to be effectively implemented.175 When the Regional Council was 
established, there was an unwritten clause in the Accord saying the PCJSS should nominate 
all the 22 members of the RC. Accordingly, the PCJSS had submitted a list to the government 
with the names of the members to be appointed. However, the government replaced the three 
Bengali members out of six with their own candidates, all members of the ruling party, 
Awami League. This might be an indication of the political will, or rather lack thereof, to 
commit to the Accord and make sure it is being implemented properly. Another threatening 
sign was the fact that the RC was hardly able to function due to non-disbursement of funds 
by the government. 176  Though RC plays a supervisory role over the three Hill District 
Councils, it is not any part of the local government system of Bangladesh or any bureaucratic 
network. Accusing the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council Act 1998, as ‘sanctity of 
unitary state’ the High Court declared it unconstitutional on 13 April, 2010.177 However the 
Appellate Division stayed in the verdict. 
 
The Accord only stated that a ministry shall be established with appointing a tribal Minister   
without specifying the role, function and activities of the ministry. However, CHT Ministry 
shall be expected to speak on behalf on the new CHT institutions and to act as an effective 
body in influencing the national decision-making process regarding the CHT. Power and 
function of the Regional Council and CHT Ministry has not been yet clearly drawn, and 
many points overlap. This has created a very conflict ridden relation between the two 
institutions and the CHT Ministry head, who is a political appointee. The refusal or failure to 
appoint a CHT indigenous person as the cabinet level minister is a major bone of contention 
among JSS members, making many highly critical to implementation of the Accord.178 
Presently, the CHT Affairs Ministry is under the portfolio of the Prime Minister, and an 
indigenous person hold the post of State Minister.  
 
One of the special bodies of interest for this study is the Land Dispute Resolution 
Commission, established to resolve disputes over ownership and user rights over lands within 
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the CHT. It is headed by a retired judge of the High Court.  Its members include the three 
Circle Chiefs, the Chairpersons of the RC and the HDCs (or their nominees) and the 
Commissioner or Additional Commissioner of the Chittagong Division (a senior civil 
servant). Since the formation in 1999, disputes about the working methods and contradictory 
provisions of 2001 Act have disrupted its work. The function of this Commission is 
necessary to curb ethnic violence, promote economic development of the area and bring what 
is called “communal harmony” in the CHT, not a small task since land dispute is the main 
problem in the CHT, playing a major role in the recently growing ethical violence.  
 
In the peace treaty, general amnesty to refugees was granted and a Task Force has been 
formed to rehabilitate tribal refugees and internal tribal evacuees. According to the 
Khagrachari DC Office 64,335 family have been rehabilitated until 2009.179 In addition, there 
have been about 60,000 indigenous Internally Displaced People (IDPs) between 1992 and 
1997. In 2004, Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network (AITPN) found that about 40 
villages of returnee refugees are still under the occupation by the settlers and over 3,000 
families did not get their land back. Almost 50 percent of returnees could not return to their 
own homesteads and native villages because they failed to get back their homesteads and 
lands.180 But unfortunately the government has sought to redefine the definition the IDPs and 
trying to fit Bengali settlers in the definition.  
 
Challenges for the CHT Land Dispute Resolution Commission 
 
The CHT is an example of a legal and juridical pluralistic system. Very few custom-based 
land and natural resource rights formally recognized by written legislation. During the 
resettlement period (1979-1984) which I have discussed in chapter four, the District’s civil 
administration, promoted by the state military, issued land titles to the non-indigenous settlers, 
considering large tracts of the CHT lands as state-owned land. Through this contested land 
distribution process, settlers occupied title many lands of indigenous people.181 Indigenous 
people considered those lands, in which titles had been issued to non-indigenous settlers, 
belong to them according to customary law and the law of prescription. They have been 
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occupying and using these lands uninterruptedly for many generations, which may be 
regarded in the legal terms be said to be ‘since time immemorial’.182  
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The Accord acknowledged the recurrence and administrative roles of the Chiefs and 
Headman, who are authorized to provide permanent resident certificates for both the 
Hillpeople and non-Hillpeople.183 CHT Regulation of 1900 also obliged the government to 
respect native customary ownership rights and to consult the chiefs and headman regarding 
their use and occupation. However, the government had not followed this, when they issued 
land titles to the many recent settlers. My interviews with five Bengali settlers uncovered that 
‘the headman’ refused to take any ‘tax’ from them. Two of them complained about this to the 
Upazilla Nirbahi Officer (Chief Executive Officer of the Government at the Sub-District 
level), but got no response from this officer.184 CHT Regulation wielded authority over lands 
and other natural resources to different traditional indigenous institutions (Karbaries, 
Headmen and Circle Chiefs) on the one hand, and state bureaucratic officials on the other. 
The above table (number five) pictures different authoritative role of indigenous institutions, 
local government bureaucrat and central administration often with suggestions and 
cooperation. As for example, the overall authority to control, regulate or prohibit swidden or 
jum cultivation granted the Deputy Commissioner.185In practice, especially in Bangladesh 
period, Karbari allocates land for jum cultivation and if Karbari fails to decide then Headman 
shall give the decision. In rare cases it reaches to the Deputy Commissioner. 186  As 
exemplified here, in CHT land ownership and management is characterized by a conflict-
ridden “legal pluralism”, in which multiple and different normative systems of land rights 
compete with each other, resulting in high level of conflicts and tenure insecurity for many 
residents. Into this contested landscape, the CHT Land Dispute Resolution Commission Act 
2001 comes in with a mandate stating that land disputes should be resolved, ‘in accordance 
with the laws, usage and practices of the region’. Considering Indigenous traditional laws and 
practices, how Land Dispute Resolution Commission would judge and deal the land dispute 
cases and establish Bengali settler land ownership right, is a question.  
 
The post- Accord laws on one hand recognize the legislative competence of the District and 
Regional Councils over customary law, but also give certain authorities to the Land Dispute 
Resolution Commission. According to the 2001 Act, the Commission shall settle disputes 
involving those who returned from the neighbouring state of Tripura, India, under the so-
called 20 Points Package agreement. A large number of indigenous people have also returned 
on 16 Point’s Package programme during the negotiation period of the previous Bangladesh 
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government and the Jumma Refugees Welfare Association. The Commission is not tasked to 
consider the rights of those who returned under the so-called 16 Point’s Package.187 Many of 
the indigenous people who returned under 16 Point’s Package have not rehabilitated properly 
and many still living as Internally Displaced People (IDPs). The implication of this provision 
shall spell out a large number of indigenous people for seeking their land ownership right and 
get proper justice. As no one can complain against the Commission’s verdict. A recent 
UNDP study (Baseline Survey 2009 of Chittagong Hill Tracts) found that an indigenous 
household on average had to change their permanent address for almost two times and around 
one in five were displaced more than once. About 10 percent of the CHT current households 
have out-migrated members who returned after the signing of the CHT Accord. Amnesty 
International has reported that there are about 60,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs) 
living in CHT.188 The Land Dispute Resolution Commission Chairman has argued for a 
cadastral survey claiming that survey will help the Commission to settle land disputes easily 
and speedily. But the Accord clearly stated that a cadastral survey is only possible after the 
finalization of the land ownership of tribal people by settlement of land disputes through 
proper verification, recording their title land and ensuring their land rights.189 If the cadastral 
survey commences before finalising the ownership title, most of the indigenous people will 
fail to show proper land documentation and even any documentation, as they are using land 
for centuries with traditional rights. UNDP study found that only about one-third of the 
population of the CHT enjoy formal land ownership. In case of indigenous people, it is 30 
percent and 42 percent for the Bengali.190  These figures might be the effect of private land 
ownership title introduced by the British and the issued title to the Bengali settlers by 
Bangladesh government.  
 
The most difficult cases before the Commission are current and will be in the future also, 
disputes involving Bengali settlers in possession of title deeds and indigenous people 
claiming their land rights, based upon customary ownership rather than backed by legal 
documents such as deeds and titles. I found during my field studies that here are also a small 
number of Bengali settlers, living in cluster villages (guchcha gram) who have titled deeds 
but do not possess any land. In the case of one respondent who came from such a community, 
he has filed a case against an indigenous person, whom he did not know. He did not even 
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know the location of the disputed land, to which he is claiming ownership. Such situation 
might be the consequence of handling over the land ownership title without following CHT 
land transfer rule. I uncover in the interview period that most case land ownership title hand 
over in the Chittagong City, where the settlers were gathered from the different District. They 
waited in the Chittagong City for land title deed and other administrative works before 
entering in CHT. In order to observe the Land Dispute Resolution Commission role in 
settling such dispute cases, we have to wait, since no settlements have been done so far.  
 
In CHT, huge tracts of lands also have been leased for rubber plantations, horticulture and 
other forestry purposes in violation of the above mentioned law. To my observation, very few 
plantation programs have started since the lands were allocated to the lessees. It will be a 
major challenge for the Land Dispute Resolution Commission to cancel these leases (mostly 
in the hands of influential people) and to redistribute the recovered land among the many 
landless people of the three Hill Districts.191  
 
Trust and Ownership Building 
 
The challenges for countries in crises and post-conflict/war situations are complex, 
multifaceted and vary due to different historical root causes of conflict and the different 
political, social and geographical contexts. 192 Legitimacy is based on several sources of 
authority of the state; due to political representation, political will to ensure transparency and 
accountability; economic reconstruction and service delivery structures which ensure basic 
rights to development and reconciliation, national and community security and border 
policing, etc. All these represent complex challenges for a state and a society recovering after 
a war or internal conflict situation. Trust building in a post-war situation in general and 
positively indicate about confidence in the post-war order and also be viewed about wider 
considerations around service delivery in public service sectors. And ownership may refer to 
how a population comes to regard certain policies ‘as their own’. Whether policies are 
designed through consultation with local actors to be responsive to local circumstances, 
culture, etc. are crucial for ownership building. Meeting such challenges, build trust over 
time and a sense of ownership to the key stakeholders and ad hoc institutions such as Truth 
Commission and Land Dispute Resolution Commission.  
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Bangladesh is still facing major challenges in implementing the Accord, a decade after it was 
signed. Actually, from the Accord was under negotiation, it has failed to building consensus 
among the mass Bengali citizens of Bangladesh. Before signing the Accord, its  contents or 
provisions were kept secret to the political groups and the public at large, resulting  in the 
absence of positive mobilisation of public opinion in favour of the Accord. The government 
ignored even the opposition’s proposal for a round table discussion and for the public 
referendum. The parties opposing the Accord formed a united platform called the Parbotto 
Sorbodolyo Oikko Parishad (United platform of all Hill parties) in the CHT, and organized 
agitations in the Hill Districts. The BNP and its allies called for strikes and blockades on 
December 7, 1997 in Dhaka and on December 10 and 11, 1997 in the three Hill Districts. The 
BNP had given an ultimatum that the Accord was not canceled by December 21, 1997, it 
would launch into a fierce struggle.193  
 
The Accord was also refuted by a section of  Pahari Chatra Parishad (PCP) (Hill Student’s 
Forum), Pahari Gono Parishad (PGP) (Hillpeople’s Council) and the Hill Women Federation. 
On December 3, 1997 the three organizations organized processions against the Accord in 
Dhaka, arguing the Accord has failed to safeguard the land rights of the Hillpeople, giving 
them actual autonomy and ensure the withdrawal of the Bengali settlers. A student leader of 
UPDF (formed by sections of PCP, PGP and Hill Women Federation) mentioned  in a 
seminar that JSS was not in a strong bargaining position to negotiate about the contents or 
provisions of the accord and was ready to be a party of the accord.194Land Dispute Resolution 
Commission history itself a problem of trust gaining. Two Commission Chairmen have 
served since the formation of the Land Dispute Resolution Commission in June 3, 1999, 
without making any progress to settle the competitive land ownership claim. There was no 
Chairman in the two-year Caretaker Government period (2007-2008). The current 
Commission Chairman, who took over the office in July 19, 2009. As per my investigations, 
he started his work by a series of concrete initiatives to solve land disputes within the three-
year period of time. This Chairman assured publicaly that land held under the customary law, 
would be considered on those terms when determining those disputes.  
 
Subsidiary rules to supplement the CHT Land Dispute Resolution Commission 2001 Act 
have not been framed yet and still do not have exact terms of reference and the detailed 
nature of its functions. Indigenous leadership is boycotting the Commission meeting arguing 
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that 21 provisions of the 2001 Act should be amended, which are contradictory with the CHT 
Peace Accord of 1997.195 I have collected evidence showing that without consulting with the 
Commission's members, including the Chairpersons of the Regional and Hill District 
Councils and the Circle Chiefs or Rajas, the Chairperson has decided the format of hearings, 
petitions, notices, etc.196 The result is that the Commission again has become dysfunctional. 
During my investigations, 66 percent of the indigenous respondents said that they do not 
have any trust with the Commission. Arguing against certain decisions, especially the 
decision to have a Cadastral Survey and the ignoring of their leadership in the decision 
making process, are expressions of their  critical stance towards the Commission. Though 
Commission has organized some discussion meeting at the District level, it has not taken 
initiative for awareness building for the residents of dispute land areas and even has not 
organized any view exchange meeting in the Upazilla level. My analysis of the interviews 
shows that none of the Bengali and Indigenous respondents are aware about the Commission 
working strategy, which laws it will make use of and about the procedural process. 80 
percent Bengali and 25 percent Indigenous respondents express that they do not know about 
the Commission Members.  
 
Another pressuring problem is the visible presence of government burucrate and military 
personnel in the meetings held by the Commission. The presence of these civil and military 
officers, give some strong signals to local Indigenous and non-indigenous population. 70 
percent of my Indigenous respondents suspect that the Commission shall not be able to 
overcome the military influence. Even 40 percent of my Bengali respondents consider the 
Commission as part of the government apparatus. In my investigations, I discovered some 
irregularities in the Commission work. The office of the Khagrachari Commission is found 
accepting the application for land dispute settlement after the deadline, while the Rangamati 
Commission’s  office does not accept any applications after the deadline.  My investigation 
did not cover the Bandarban Commission’s office activities. The Khagrachari office has 
charged a fee of 200 Taka from each application for future communication purpose, like 
sending mail, calling for further information, etc. without giving any receipt.197 However, the 
claimants who have appeared before the Rangamati office have not been charged for such 
purposes. The above issues highlight that absence of written terms  and functions of the 
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Commission making its path more complicated and signaling that Indigenous people might 
be the victim of swindle and fraud and deprive again from justice. 
 
Two Headmen have told that instead of using Post Office, the Commission sent official mail 
through the Thana (Local Police Station). They consider this practice as a harassment, 
granted the police repute as being biased in favour of the Bengali settlers. My query about 
overall satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the Commission’s work, was met with responses that 
do not pain a black-and-white picture. In fact, 45 percent Indigenous respondents and 30 
percent Bengali respondents state that they are not happy with the Commission work. Rest of 
the percentages divided into two; some percentage considered that it is too early to draw a 
line and others believe that current government will make the Commission effective. 
 
Chapter Summary  
 
The above discussions highlight that Bangladesh still has to go a long way to strengthen  
democracy, ensure rule of law and to protect human rights. A democratic culture is absent 
both in government and political parties level. Various laws and policies have been 
formulated to protect the minority rights, but rarely implemented. Many ‘Investigations 
Committees’ and ‘Commissions’ have submitted thousands of pages suggestions and 
recommendations. However, their suggestions and recommendations are rarely implemented. 
Formation of ‘Commissions’ and such type of bodies have become a fashion in Bangladeshi 
political culture. People will not judge me wrong, if I argue, people start to believe that they 
will never be benefited from such institutions, and they are doing nothing but ‘paper work’. 
National Identity building issues, which I discussed in chapter four and political cultures in 
chapter five have divided Bangladesh society. It is fair to say ‘trust’, ‘consensus’ and 
‘ownership’ building for any ‘institution’ or ‘policy’ shall be hard in Bangladesh. 
Participation of Indigenous leadership in policy making process is crucial for trust building 
from indigenous community. Proper integration of customary governance practices and 
structures will help to gain trust from Indigenous community and for that government has to 
amendment the 2001 Land Dispute Resolition Act and formulates other policies to strengthen 
local government institutions in CHT. A large number of military presences and their 
involvement in civil affairs influenced negatively trust gaining issues. Dhaka and New Delhi 
need to cooperate on a common policy to prevent any future unraveling insurgency both in 
the CHT and in the northeast India. The present Awami League government promised in 
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their 2008 election manifesto that they will formulate laws and other policies to implement 
the Accord fully. A strong political motivation will help to reach on a consensus and will 
reduce the gap between the government and indigenous leaderships in policy formulation 
process.  
 
Next chapter will focus on the national politics and political culture in Bangladesh and its’ 
influence on trust and ownership building processes. Geopolitical issue and civil-military 
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Chapter Six: Nature of State and Politics 
 
This chapter will describe the hobbled democratic transition of Bangladesh from military to 
civilian rule and the ongoing struggle for representative democracy. This chapter highlights 
civil-military relations in the country and its influence on politics, civil and military 
administration and the role and operation of the military forces. How laws and policies have 
formulated to recognize and establish indigenous rights and the implications of such policies 
are discussed. The geopolitical issues of Bangladesh as a small state and CHT as a buffer 
region is debated in order to highlight its’ influence on the nationalism and identity building 
issues.  
 
Democracy, Political Parties and CHT 
 
Though Bangladesh has been celebrated its forty years of independence, democratic and 
human rights base institutions remain quite weak. The cherished goal of democratic rights of 
the people was enshrined in the constitution in 1972, but in less than two years after the first 
parliament was elected, the structure and character of the fundamental law of the land were 
changed. In January 1975, through a ‘constitutional coup’ a presidential system of 
government replaced the parliament form. In June, all political parties were dissolved and 
were asked to join the newly formed national party, Bangladesh Krishak Shramik Awami 
League. 198  All newspapers were banned except four, to be retained by the state; the 
fundamental rights were suspended and made non-enforceable and the judiciary was reduced 
into a subservient agency of the executive branch of the state.199 After the August 1975 
bloody coup, General Zia, who often introduced himself as a ‘soldier’ not politician did not 
return to the barrack but introduced military participation in the so called democratization 
process in Bangladesh. This is common in the Third World countries; where military regimes 
normally highlights the failure of politicians to effectively manage the democratic system and 
pledge to restore representative government, but only in rare circumstances do military ruler 
transfer power to democratically-elected civilian governments.200 In December 1978, General 
Zia stressed: ‘‘I and my government believe in full democracy and are determined to restore 
the government of the elected representative of the people in due time’’201, In a similar tone, 
Ziaul Huq declared in Pakistan: ‘‘I want to make it absolutely clear that neither do I have any 
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political ambitions.’’ He promised elections in 90 days, but took 90 months to fullfil this 
pledge. 202  In Bangladesh General Zia formed BNP to ‘‘fight’’ the electoral battle and 
obtained legitimacy for military rule and civilise his regimes. In Bangladesh, likewise, the 
scheduled elections were postponed several times.203 While only one military bureaucrat had 
been elected to the Parliament in 1973, 19 bureaucrats were elected in 1979; of the 19, 17 
were retired military officers and two were civilian bureaucrats.204Like General Ayub’s 
‘Basic Democracies’, Zia introduced, Gram Parishad in 1976 and later renamed it Swanirvar 
Gram Sarkar in 1980, with the hope to mobilize support for the regime and also give the rural 
people a sense of participation. Though Zia had formed BNP to serve as his political base, he 
repealed the Political Parties Regulation Order of 1976205 and amended the constitution to 
give him almost unlimited powers. He rejected the opposition proposals that included a return 
to the parliamentary form of government and reinstatement of the secularism principle in the 
constitution. Rashed Khan Memon, the only Marxist-Leninist MP of that Parliament, 
described parliament as not ‘‘sovereign’’, calling it ‘‘a school-debating society with an 
indulgent president sometimes languidly watching from the gallery’’ 206  
 
After the assassination of Zia on May 30, 1981, Chief of the Staff of the Army, General 
Ershad, who was praised for supporting the constitutional government and restoring order to 
the military after the failed coup, gradually revealed his covert intentions. He argued the case 
for a constitutionally mandated role for the military in national decision-making to prevent 
further military takeovers. Ershad, who took advantage of the deteriorating law and order 
situation, the internal strife in the ruling BNP and the President's irresolute personality, as 
well as the weakness of political institutions, to stage a coup in March 1982 and ultimately 
the suspension of the constitution, proclamation of martial law, dissolution of parliament, and 
a ban on political activities. Ershad held a referendum in 1985 and presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 1986 to legitimize his rule.207 Unlike Zia, Ershad also organized 
his own political party, ‘the Jatiya (National) Party’. The third parliamentary elections, held 
in April 1986 in an atmosphere of political mistrust and suspicion, evoked little enthusiasm 
among voters. Twenty eight political parties, mostly minor, took part including Awami 
League. However, BNP boycotted the election. The Awami League taken aback by the result 
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was trenchantly bitter and accused the regime of indulging in ‘vote piracy’. Independent 
electoral observers from United Kingdom branded the elections a ‘tragedy for democracy’ 
and a ‘cynically frustrated exercise’. Overseas journalists also reported massive vote rigging 
and other corrupt practices by supporters of the regime. The civil bureaucracy, including the 
police, was accused of manipulating election results to the advantage of Ershad's party.208  
However, Ershad has to resign from the Presidency in 1990. 
 
Bangladesh entered a phase of into parliamentary democracy through a general election in 
1991. Democracy as an institution is new and still in ‘the making’ in Bangladesh. The ruling 
parties generally have tended to undermine the Parliament. The opposition parties have been 
using the strategy of ‘boycotting the sessions’ to put any sitting government under pressure. 
Desertion of Parliament on the part of opposition parties has been observed as a dominant 
phenomenon in Bangladesh politics during the last three Parliaments. The opposition 
deserted in the Fifth Parliament 300 (75 per cent) out of a total of 400 days; in the Seventh 
Parliament 156 (40.83 per cent) out of a total of 382 days, and in the Eighth Parliament 223 
(59.78 per cent) out of a total 373 days at work. During the three Parliaments, the opposition 
remained absent from 58.78 per cent of the sessions.209 The Opposition was engaged in 
prolonged violent street agitation, causing considerable damage to the country’s economy 
and its political system. Even the running Parliament is facing the same. Opposition 
boycotted Parliament for a long time. Parliamentary discussions have not only lost their 
contents and essence, inappropriate language, unparliamentarily appellation and intemperate 
exchanges dominate parliamentary deliberations. Prolonged and periodic walkouts by 
opposition even on unnecessary grounds characterize the very vulnerability and low level of 
credibility of deliberations in parliamentary sessions.  
 
From the above paragraphs we can say that from its birth, Bangladesh has suffered numerical 
challenges to establish democracy and its’ institutionalization process. Political parties 
whoever came in power pursue policies to weaken the democratic institutions instead of 
strengthening them. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the policies, which 
government has initiated to establish indigenous rights and bring peace in the CHT region. 
Whether democracy played a constructive role for such a policy making process is under 
discussion.  
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In the 6th Parliament (June 1996-June 2001) there were three elected MPs and one woman 
nominated MPs from the indigenous groups, all from the CHT. In the 8th Parliament only one 
indigenous MP was elected from CHT. Again in the 9th Parliament, three MPs were elected 
from CHT indigenous groups and one nominated woman MP from CHT.210 During the Ziaur 
Rahman period, a tribal convention has been called and held four rounds of talks with the 
PCJSS during July 1977 and December 1978 with the objective of preparing a ground for 
political dialogue. The effort failed due to lack of trust between and within the parties.211 Zia 
established Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board, but the indigenous leadership did not 
respond positively to the Board. Zia’s attempts could be seen as more of a bureaucratic-
military approach. There was hardly any role for the elected Members of Parliament.212  
 
Same happened during the Ershad period. The peace negotiation actors on the government 
side were senior military and intelligence officers. During the democratic regime of Khaleda 
Zia (1991-1996), multi-party Parliamentary Committee was formed led by Communication 
Minister, Oli Ahmed. He was tasked to find out the solutions to ‘‘the problems’’ of CHT 
through the democratic and peaceful processes of dialogue and participation of all concerned. 
A sub-committee was also formed led by Rashed Khan Menon. Though the two committees 
meet several times with the PCJSS, government did not disclose the content of the dialogues. 
There was no feed back to the parliament.213 The Awami League, which came power in 1996, 
reopened the negotiations. Building on its election promises of initiate a political solution to 
bring peace in the CHT, a twelve-member national committee on CHT Affairs was formed, 
incorporating two MPs drawn from BNP and JP. However, the MP from BNP never 
participated in the national committee. With a series of meeting with the PCJSS and national 
committee, the Peace Accord signed on December 2, 1997. There was no third party in the 
negotiation process. Even the leading members of the parliament from the treasury and the 
opposition bench had hardly any clue about the negotiation process and content.214  The 
Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts introduced four bills into the parliament in April 1998. 
BNP objected to the four bills and sponsored some 4,000 amendments to the proposals. The 
discussion on the bills continued only for 2/3 days. Without further scrutiny of the 
Committee of the bills were passed. The Speaker of the Parliament refused to discuss the 
amendments. BNP walkout and Jatiya Party lawmaker vote against the Regional Council Bill, 
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which was passed on May 6, 1998.215 Even the government did not involve the field level 
administrations in the process, who are ultimately vested with the responsibility of 
implementing the torsion task. On the other hand, the leaders of the PCJSS took the overall 
responsibility of tribal welfare on their shoulder and signed the treaty without any 
consultation with other parties or groups in the CHT, who were also fighting for their rights. 
The characteristics of this policy seem to fit with the characteristics of the elite model where 
the reflection of people’s choice in policy is missing. During the last month of parliament 
Awami League government passed the controversial CHT Land Dispute Resolution 
Commission Act 2001, without consultation with the PCJSS.216 Since the formation of the 
District Councils on January 25, 1998, elections have not been held to date, which in turn are 
supposed to elect Regional Council. Both the government appointed their own man as 
chairman in the Districts Council, despite protests by the PCJSS. Even in this current 
Parliament, opposition leader Khaleda Zia, on March 15, 2011 narrated Santu Larma as a 
‘murderer’ and ‘terrorist’. 217 Government finds itself between ‘‘the horns’’ of a dilemma, if 
the treaty is implemented in its original form, including a few unwritten agreements, BNP 
and JI might intensify their mass movements against it. On the other hand, if the government 
brings some changes it the treaty provisions, as alleged by Santu Larma, to satisfy the 
opposition, there might be a renewed wave of tribal insurgency.218 In addition to Bengali 
settlers, two tribal groups, namely Hill Women Association and particularly Hill Student 
Council, have been employing considerable pressure through hartals, and terror tactics such 
as torture and kidnaping of selected tribal supporters of the Accord. 
  
Since the independence of Bangladesh, the demand for constitutional recognition of the 
identity of the Jumma people has been rejected by the government. In the year 1985, at the 
working group’s fourth session, Bangladesh countered that ‘indigenous’ refers only to ‘‘those 
countries where racially distinct people coming from overseas established colonies and 
subjugated the indigenous populations.’’The entire population of Bangladesh was 
autochthonous, by comparison, and all had ‘conexisted’ prior to the formation of ethnic 
divisions by British administrators.219 On 13th September 2007, when the General Assembly 
of the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Rights on Indigenous Peoples, 
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Bangladesh governments abstened from the voting. 220  In the current constitutional 
amendment process, indigenous people of Bangladesh are strongly raising their voice to 
recognize them constitutionally as ‘adivasi’ instead of ‘small ethnic group’. Civil Society 
members, intellectuals and many political parties supported their demand and requested the 
government for constitutional recognition, but the government has not declared its official 
position yet. The above points show that in the policy formulation process democracy has 
played a very limited role. Policies have been formulated with elitite model.  
 
Civil-Military Relations in Bangladesh and CHT 
 
The occurrence of military interventions in the political life of a country has not been a 
feature of this century. Although the earlier analysts tended to look at the military institution 
as “an alien and demonic” political group incapable of interacting with other social groups 
but able to act against them, it was only after the end of the Second World War that the 
political scientists started to develop a different point of view towards it.221 Hence, whereas 
Machiavelli would argue that a "military man cannot be a good man", Voltaire would 
describe them as the "manifestation of brute force in rationalized form", and Samuel Adams 
would claim that a standing army, however necessary it may be, is always dangerous to the 
liberties of the people.222 Several post-war political scientists begun thinking of the military 
as a legitimate pressure group, capable of playing a positive role in the socio-political 
transformation of the newly created peripheral states. A number of them appeared to agree 
with Finer’s assumption that "in all countries ruled by civilians, the armed forces...are in no 
better, but certainly no worse a moral position than any [other] departments of civil 
administration...to persuade the government to their point of view". 223  
 
Military interventions in politics in the Third World countries are part of a pattern where 
political and party institutions are weak and so it the democratic culture. Poor governance by 
civilian leaders, fractious political parties concerned more with their narrow and sectarian-
rather than broad-national interests, rampant corruption in public life and a stagnant economy 
add up to the factors paving the way for the army to step into politics, through either direct or 
indirect ways.224 Army started to take part in Bangladesh politics during the Liberation War 
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of 1971. That time army closely worked with the civil political leadership. After the 
Independence, army was used as an aid-to-civil power for several months to quell Marxist-
Leninist groups that created a reign of terror in the Districts of Pabna and Rajshahi.225 
Drastics cut in the defense budget and the formation of a preferential treatment for the Jatiya 
Rakhi Bahini (National Security Force) alarmed the military about its gloomy future. 
Demotions, dismissals and forced retirements of some officers because of personal conflicts 
with the AL leaders contributed enormously to the disenchantment of the military. By 1975, 
‘anyone talking to the jawans [soldiers] and officers could easily feel that, given resolute 
leadership, the army was prepared any moment to topple the Mujib government.226 A dozen 
mid-level officers, mostly Majors did coup on 15 August 1975 and killed Mujib and all his 
family members, except two daughters and overthrew the elected government and its 
administration. The officers announced that the coup was a historic necessity, staged to bring 
the end of an era of tyranny. August’s coup was followed by another coup led by Brigadier 
Khaled Musharraf, some consider him as pro-Mujib,  on 3 Novermber 1975. After 3 days a 
counter coup happened on November 7, in which Major General Ziaur Rahman227 emerged 
as the strongman of Bangladesh politics. At the end of 1975, proved beyond any doubt that 
Militray as an institution was highly polarised, politicised and fractionlized as pro-Indians vs 
anti-Indians, socialists vs anti-socialists, freedom fighters vs repatriate from Pakistan.228 In 
September 1975, Zia passed the Indemnity Ordinance absolved the assassins of Mujib and 
prominent AL leaders. Most of the rebellious officers responsible for the August 1975 coup 
were rewarded with lucrative appointments in Bangladesh missions abroad. From 1972 to 
1981 military expenditure rose by approximately 186 percent. Despite having no background 
on civilian administration, military officers were posted into strategic decision making 
positions in the government secretariat, state-run corporations, police administrations and 
diplomatic missions abroad. 6 of 20 First Secretaries were ex-police officers, 14 of 20 
Superintendents of Police were ex-army majors and captains and 10 of the 20 heads of the 
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top public corporations were ex-military officers.229 A number of observers have linked Zia’s 
regime to that of Suharto’s Indonesia, where military and ex-military officers are in 
responsible of strategic, bureaucratic and economic positions in an ostensibly non-military 
regime, and where corruption has become institutionalized.230 After the assassination of Zia 
on May 30, 1981, the army again overthrew the elected BNP government in a bloodless coup 
on 24 March 1982 led by Army Chief Lt. General Hussain Mohammad Ershad. On 
November 28, 1981, as the Chief of Army Staff, Ershad declared that the only way to ensure 
stability and democracy in Bangladesh was to give a proper role to the military in our society. 
In one interview with New York Times, he mentioned:  
 
Insha’Allah there will be no more coups, but what you have to do, is to find constitutional 
solutions so that no coup and no killing occur after one year, ten years or ever again…Our 
army is an efficient body, well disciplined and most honest, it is made of organized forces 
which are devoted to the nation. The potential of such an exceptional force ca be genuinely 
used for productive and nation-building purposes, in addition to its role in national defence.231 
 
On July 12,  1987 Ershad tried to include military representative in local councils with the 
Local Government (Zilla Parishad) Amendment Bill, dominated by Jatiya Party lawmaker in 
Parliament. Ershad pushed the militarization of administration initiated by Zia a further step. 
In 1987, about 1500 militaries were appointed in civilian administration and one particular 
moment 53 out of 64 Districts Superintendent were military officers.232 After much agitation 
by three main political parties, on 6 December 1990, Ershad resigned and handed over power 
to Chief Justice Shahabuddion Ahmed, in Bangladesh’s first transfer of power through non-
military means. In May 1996, President Abdur Rahman Biswas (elected by the BNP 
dominated fifth parliament) sacked and interned Bangladesh Army Chief Lt. General Abu 
Saleh Mohammad Nasim and some of his top military colleagues, allegedly for conspiring to 
topple the government. This sacking was the first time history in post-colonial South Asia by 
a civilian authority. The sacked officers claimed that the President intended to rig the seventh 
parliament elections, scheduled for 12 June 1996, in favour of BNP by using the army. 
Whether the alleged coup conspiracy was real or imagined; the army demonstrated its 
acceptance of civilian supremacy by not challenging any stern action of civilian president. 
This could be argued by the changing nature of world politics and the democratization flow 
with the fall of Berlin Wall. President Clinton pointed out in his speech at Georgetown 
University in 1991, countries with democratic governments are more likely to be reliable 
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partners in trade and diplomacy and less likely a threat to peace than those with other forms 
of government.233 In November 1996, Parliament passed the Indemnity (Repeal) Act and the 
Mujib assasination case reopened. In November 1998, Dhaka court ordered execution of 15 
of those scentered  for killing of Mujib and his family members. They were hanged in 
January 2010. However, the trial has not created any adverse repercussions in the military 
institutions.  
 
On 11 January 2007, while a consensus between the AL and the BNP could not be reached to 
hold credible polls, President Iajuddin canceled the election, imposed a state of emergency 
and stepped down as Chief Advisor of the Caretaker Government in favour of Fakhruddin 
Ahmed, a retired bureaucrat backed by the army. The army came again in ‘‘the driver’s seat’’, 
in negotiating the political process behind the so-called caretaker government. A National 
Coordination Committee against Crime and Corruption created headed by the 9th Infantry 
Division’s General Officers Commanding (GOC), Major-General Masud Uddin Chowdhury, 
which drafts in all seven GOCs as members. Army attempts to implement the minus-two 
formula, reminiscent of the Pakistani experiment of eliminating the late Benzir Bhutto and 
Nawaz Sharif and arrested Sheikh Hasina on 16th July 2007 and Khaleda Zia on 3rd 
September, in addition to several members of Khaleda Zia’s family and a number of top 
political leaders both from AL and BNP. Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Moeen U Ahmed 
did not hesitate to take a public stance on national issues and policies. On April 2007 while 
articulating his views on the future political scenario in Bangladesh. He said categorically: 
‘‘we do not want to go back to an ‘elective democracy’ where corruption in society becomes 
all-pervasive, governance suffers in terms of insecurity and violation of rights, and where 
political criminalisation threatens the very survival and integrity of the state’’.234 For a more 
inhanced role in politics and administration, army wanted to set up the National Security 
Council, where they would have been given a decisive role in taking major decisions 
concerning security matters, both military and non-military.235 However, the idea has not 
concluded in any form. Another major challenge came out for the democratic elected 
government when the BDR mutiny took place in 25-26 February 2009 in Dhaka, killing more 
than 70 officers from Bangladesh Army, No doubt, the army and its officers were greatly hurt 
by the brutal killings of their fellow army men, but under the enlightened leadership of 
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General Moeen U Ahmed, army refused to cross the limit. Though in a audio made available 
to public the army officers were heard talking angrily with Shaikh Hasina, the army decided 
to abide by the decisions taken by the civilian government. In fact, in a never before example, 
the army chief General Moeen publicly stated that the army of Bangladesh was subservient to 
the civilian government.236 This was major departure from the past. This statement of Moeen 
gave ‘‘a shot in the arm’’ to the fledgling democracy in Bangladesh. 
 
Civil-Military relations in CHT mainly started during the insurgency period of the mid 70s, 
when the 24 Infantry Division of Bangladesh Army was entrusted responsibility to combat 
the armed struggle of the Santi Bahini. With the ‘Operation Dabanol’ (Operation Wild-fire), 
the whole CHT administration went under the authority of the military. From development 
facilities, to tribal affairs and forest resource management all came under direct control when 
GOC of 24 Infantry Division of Bangladesh Army was appointed as Chairman of Chittagong 
Hill Tracts Development Board in 1982. That Board was established in 1976 with the aim for 
economic development of the CHT, based on a counter terrorism concerns. However, from 
1996-2006, one indigenous MP and one Bengali MP from CHT served as the Chairman of 
the CHTDB. 237  GOC was appointed Chairman again in the last Caretaker Government 
(2007-2009) period. The current Chairman is an indigenous MP. From 2001, army started the 
‘Operation Uttoron’ (Operation Upliftment) programme which has interfered with the civil 
administrative institutions. During my field research, both my Bengali and indigenous 
respondents have shared similar views about the army influence on civil administration. 
Bengali respondents stated that they tend to seek help from the army instead of civil 
administration in crisis.  
 
The above discussion highlights that military has played a dominating role in the politics of 
Bangladesh. Like a quite many third world countries, the military has intervened in the 
democratic process. Political parties can also be blamed for not playing a constructive role in 
institutionalizing the democratic process. In the following paragraph, I will discuss about the 
development of foreign policy of Bangladesh towards India and in particular how religion 
and nationalism have influenced Bangladeshis policy formulation process towards is giant 
neighbour, and the consequences which have followed. 
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The Relationship with India  
 
History is the first and leading determinant of the foreign policy of Bangladesh towards India.  
Though some scholars, particularly Indian scholars believe that Indo-Bangladesh relations 
formalised with Bangladesh independence in 1971, Bangladeshis see the relationship from a  
different vantage point. The struggle for a separate Bengali identity, started in the mid-1930s  
not only distinct from Hindu majority of the province, but also from their co-believers of the 
other regions of India. In the 1940 Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League, A. K. 
Fazlul Haq called for more than one state for the Muslims of India, thereby seeking rights 
and interests for the Bengali Muslims in Bengal. Though Bengali Muslim enthusiastically 
supported the cause of Pakistan in 1947, when Mohammad Ali Jinnah declared ‘Urdu’ as a 
state language in January 1948, the language movement started and Bengali nationalism was 
revived with the February 21, 1952 as a formative date.238 After Independence, returning 
from Pakistan, Mujib in his speech at Kolkata on February 16, 1972 stated: ‘‘I have no doubt 
that India, our next door neighbour will proudly march on as the largest democracy, with 
secularism and socialism at home and non-alignment in international relations.’’ The Awami 
League government officially announced that ‘‘friendship with India is a cornerstone of the 
foreign policy of Bangladesh.’’On March 19, 1972, Bangladesh signed the 25-year Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Peace with India.  
 
An anti-India sentiment grew in the military when Indian Army did not hand over all the 
sophisticated weapons and vehicles captured from the Pakistan Army to the poorly equiped 
Bangladesh armed forces and took away to  India.239 The formation of Jatiya Rakhi Bahini240 
(National Security Force) by Mujib with advise and support from India extended the 
sentiments another step. After independence, when India stopped its aid owing to her own 
economic position, anti-Indian feelings became strong and an important determinant of the 
foreign policy towards India. In June 1973, when an Indian trade delegation visited Dacca, 
Maulana Bhasani called hartal and went on a fast, demanding an end of the 25 year 
Friendhisp Treaty. After the assassination of Mujib on August 15, 1975, and the successive 
military rule, foreign policy of Bangladesh began to be viewed as anti-Indian, anti-Soviet and 
pro-US, pro-West and pro-Pakistan or pro-Islamic. Ziaur Rahman tried to internationalise 
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Ganga Water dispute and took the Farakka issue to the OIC Foreign Ministers’ Conference in 
Istanbul in May 1976, in the Colombo Summit of the non-aligned countries in August 1976 
and in the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly in Novermber 1976.241 India’s river-flow 
blockade attempts, position on the so-called maritime belt issue, unilateral seizure of two 
newly raised islands in the Bay of Bengal, establishment of camps on Bangladesh territory, 
talk of pushing ‘outsiders’ from India’s northeastern regions into Bangladesh and failure to 
implement the 1974 border agreements, all contributed to serious strains on the Dacca-New 
Delhi relations. 242  
 
When Indira Gandhi assumed power after the January 1980 election, Zia went to New Delhi 
along with the proposal to sell gas to India. However, the relationship has not developed in a 
satisfactory level. After the assassination of Zia in 1981, General H. M. Ershad followed 
Zia’s anti-India and anti-Soviet plank. The ‘India locked’position of Bangladesh makes the 
Bangladeshis feel India can dominate and easily alter the political situation of Bangladesh.  
During the conflict between the military and Santi Bahini in CHT, a large number of CHT 
indigenous people, mainly Chakma fled to Tripura, India. Bangladesh government accused 
India to encouarge the Santi Bahini and giving them military and strategic support. Much like 
other states in South Asia, Bangladesh also started resenting India’s overwhelming regional 
presence. India eventually became one of the central issues around which domestic politics in 
Bangladesh revolved. Opposing India became the most effective way of burnishing one’s 
nationalist credentials in Bangladesh, and political parties (with the possible exception of the 
Awami League), made full use of this political tactic. During the 1991 democratic election, 
BNP used the anti-India stand as a major election plank. During 1991 Khaleda government 
there were three prime ministerial, six ministerial, eight secretaries-level and a number of 
Joint River Commission meeting took place, however both sides could not reach any 
acceptable solution on the Farakka issue.243 In April 1992, BJP led India passed a resolution 
claiming that over 15 million Bangladeshis had illegally entered India. This illegal 
immigration issue and Babri Mosque demolition in India and the riots that followed in 
Bangladesh, adversely impact the relationship. However India handed over the Tin Bigha244 
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Corridor on a lease and opened it for use by Bangladeshi passengers and vehicular traffic on 
June 26, 1992.245  
 
When Sheikh Hasina came to power in 1996, the relationship between two governments 
improved significantly. Number of agreements and treaties signed including the Ganga 
Water-Sharing Treaty on December 12, 1996, with strong opposition from the BNP and 
Jamaat-I-Islami.246 Both Bangladesh and Indian government reached an understanding of not 
supporting insurgencies in each other’s territory. India decided to stop giving aid and support 
to the Santi Bahini. Without loosing indian base and support, Santi Bahini signed the historic, 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Treaty on 2 December 1997, ending the decades old insurgency 
in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Though Hasina agreed on a transshipment agreement on July 
28, 1999 and it came into effect in January 2002, but it was discontinued after a while.247  
 
The military confrontation between India’s Border Security Force and Bangladesh Rifles 
between April 15 and 19, 2001 gave a critical twist to Indo-Bangladesh relations. One of the 
major election planks of the BNP/Jamaat-e-Islami coalition government (2001-2006) was the 
demand to renegotiate the Ganga Water Sharing Treaty. During the coalition government, the 
activities of terrorist and extremist groups increased manifold, culminating in the near 
simultaneous, close to 500 bomb blasts through out Bangladesh in August 2005. India 
accused Bangladesh for giving the logistics, training and infrastructure support to the 
insurgents group from North East India and also blamed that Pakistan’s ISI was allowed to 
using Bangladesh as a conduit for many terrorist operations in India. When Sheikh Hasina 
came power for the second term after the December 2008 election, firmly stated that 
‘‘Bangladesh will not allow its territory to be used for activities directed against any other 
country, combining to establish a regional South Asian Task Force to combat terrorism and 
militancy’' Jamaat-e-Islami described the Task Force proposal together with any suggestion 
of providing transit facilities to India as ‘anti-national’ and going against the sovereignty of 
Bangladesh. Khaleda Zia has also threatened to launch a people’s movement if any ‘anti-
national’ proposal are considered.248 During Hasina's state visit to India from January 10-13, 
2010, both the Prime Ministers agreed on a vision for the future in the pursuit of the common 
good- bilaterally, regionally and globally." The two prime ministers upheld the principle of 
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democracy as the main basis of improving the relations between the two countries. Though 
not clearly stated, they held deficient democracy as a main factor for ‘‘the ups and downs’’ in 




This above discussion points and issues highlight the democratic struggle of Bangladesh and 
how the democratic journey has been disrupted various times by the security force. The 
military has taken advantage of the absence of strong democratic institutions and influenced 
strongly politics and policy formulation process. The military has also played an influential 
role in the foreign policy making process towards India. Cultural nationalism and identity 
issues (in the military rule period), have influenced the policy formation process in 
Bangladesh for establishing indigenous rights. Institutionalization of democracy and its 
practice will help the political parties to reach on a consensus and find a common goal. This 
will also be helped from further military intervention in civic life. A mutual, cooperative and 
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The accord sought to devolve into political and economic powers to the Hillpeople and 
thereby empower them by creating the new institutional body like Regional Council and 
strengthening the three Hill District Councils and Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts along 
with the traditional and administrative authorities who were running since the British colonial 
period. Though theoretically more layers of administration help for a better check and 
balance, but within the context the Bangladesh political and administrative system vis-à-vis 
the CHT, this has created more problems than solutions. In one hand, CHT Regulation 
District maintained the traditional institutions like the Circle Chiefs and Headman but 
executive, judiciary and financial power vested in the Deputy Commissioner. The power of 
Circle Chiefs is limited to the collection of taxes and the dispensation of justice in the 
traditional courts. Though the Chiefs are playing an advisory role to assist the Deputy 
Commissioner in the administration of their respective circles, the Deputy Commissioner is 
not obliged to take their advice or heed their decisions. The 1997 Accord empowered the Hill 
District Councils administratively to deal with land administration in CHT. According to the 
provisions of the Accord, ‘prior consent’ of the Hill District Council is necessary for 
‘settlement, leases and transfer’ and ‘compulsory acquisitions’ of land in CHT regions. 
Authority and function of lower-tire land and revenue administration officials, such as 
‘Assistant Commissioner (land), Kanungo, Chainman and Headman also have to be vested 
under Hill District Council. Although the aforesaid matters have been included within the 
Local Government Council (Amendment) Acts of 1998, the requisite authority has not yet 
been transferred to the councils. If the councils fully empowered then what role Deputy 
Commissioner will play in the District land administration and what will be the nature of 
relationship with other institutions is not yet known.  
 
In CHT, two legal regimes of customary land law and formalized state laws on lands and 
forests are coexisted but not without tension since the formal annexation of CHT into British 
Bengal. Most of these rights have never been defined by law or ancillary administrative 
regulations or orders. According to the Peace Accord, CHT Land Dispute Resolution 
Commission will be obliged to carry out its functions by taking into account the ‘‘laws, 
customs and conventions prevailing in the CHT’’ 249  Rule 50 and 41 A of the CHT 
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Regulation and Forest Act of 1927 through CHT Forest Transit Rules 1973 directly 
acknowledged the right to ‘occupy’ homestead land in rural areas and the right to use timber, 
bamboo and other ‘minor’ forest produces for bona fide domestic purposes. Though the 
Commission has got its constitution but its exact terms of reference and detailed function are 
not yet formulated. Whether Commission will declare the Bengali settlers’ title illegal, issued 
by the Government of Bangladesh, without following the proper land transfer system (see 
appendix IV) or the Commission will give emphasis on customary law when dealing land 
disputes, is not yet clear. If the commission is not going to declare the Bengali settler’s title 
illegal then what will be the priority for dispute resolution, when conflicting claims based 
upon the registered title from the District land registries, titles based on the registers of the 
headman, ownership and user rights based upon informal leases granted by headman (for the 
Karnaphuli reservoir area lowlands known as fringe lands), rights based upon long user or 
prescription, and custom-based rights come up before the Commission.  
 
According to 2001 Land Dispute Resolution Act, no appeals will be allowed against the 
decisions of the Commission. May be this provision included to provide justice in an 
expeditious manner. I found seventy percent of my respondents both from the indigenous and 
Bengali community feel that there should be a provision for appeal. In this case, Chakma 
Raja Devasish Roy, also a member of CHT Land Dispute Resolution Commission suggests 
the option of judicial review in the Supreme Court. This may act as a check and balance on 
the Commission’s decision.  
 
In present CHT, Bengali settlers are now fifty percent or more in number. Government had 
brought these Bengali settlers more than 30 years ago, with a hope for land title ownership 
and better future. If the commission declares Bengali settlers’ title illegal then what will be 
the government policy to settle such a large number of people. Government has not yet 
discussed and develop any strategic plan to tackle such crisis so far I know.    
 
Another problem is that, Bengali settlers will raise a political movement against such 
decisions, which easily attracted many local and national political parties and government 
could be in trouble. It is however a question whether or not the government is ready as well 
as willing to take such type of pressure on its shoulder.  
 
The lack of democracy and absence of democratic values are one of the major causes for the 
non-implementation of the CHT Accord. The BNP led coalition government came into power 
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in 2001. They oppose the Accord from the very beginning. However, they did not terminate 
the Accord but did nothing to implement. During their tenure (2001-2006), the Accord 
Implementation Committee was inactive and serious human rights violation reports published 
by various national and international bodies. In many occasions, they tried to misguide 
Bangladeshi people, presenting CHT issues erroneously. The PCJSS, signing party of the 
Accord submitted 21 points demand to amendment the Land Dispute Resolution Commission 
Act 2001. The present government assures many times that contradictory laws would be 
regulated to implement the Accord fully. However, no initiative has taken yet in the 
Parliament. Even in the current Parliament, Opposition Leader Khaleda Zia branded PCJSS 
President and Regional Council Chairman, Santu Larma as murderer and terrorist. 
Indigenous leaderships are in doubt that whether the present government will play an 
effective role to implement the Accord fully or what would be the future of the Accord if 
BNP forms government in future. 
 
The role of military has been pointed as another influential issue and many identified as the 
main influential component in relation to the implementation of the Accord. It is difficult to 
predict whether Bangladeshi democracy and politics will be able to overcome the influence 
of military and what would be the future civil-military relation in Bangladesh-these are issues 
I think become crucial in terms of implementing the Accord.   
 
The Accord failed to build trust among political parties at the national level as well as among 
the factional groups in CHT. Without local ownership, it is hard to imagine how 
reconstruction efforts will turn into local priorities, support local capacities and seize local 
opportunities. Full implementation of the Accord with addressing the issues and challenges 
can resolve the question of autonomy, which was the root cause of the conflict. The 
leadership of CHT has to develop a long term strategy to negotiate with the Government of 
Bangladesh to bring forth further devolution in the spirit of the CHT Accord of 1997. These 
include the transfer of land administration authority to the Hill District Councils, the just 
resolution of land disputes by the CHT Land Dispute Resolution Commission, and the 
rehabilitation of the internally displaced indigenous people. CHT leaderships need to develop 
a meaningful partnership not only with the progressive section of Bangladesh society but also 
with mainstream Bangladesh society.  
Many small indigenous groups accused PCJSS dominated by the Chakma, and they have 
hardly any representative in the newly constructive local government system. More 
safeguards need to represent the views of the small indigenous groups. The Accord does not 
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provide any time frame for its implementation. A time bound, strategic framework can 
resolve the controversy and doubt over non-implementation of the Accord. Constitutional 
safeguard of the Accord and for its new self-government system is necessary as it suspects 
for potential unconstitutional arrangement. If the points or the provisions of the Accord 
implemented fully, this could be a model for the future conflict management tools, especially 






Action should be taken to reach a political consensus in support of the Accord at the national 
and regional level. Darby and MacGinty suggest, ‘‘to make sure that agreements are fully 
implemented and sustained, post-agreement political activity is required. The danger is that 
parties may wish to disregard or re-negotiate some provisions in an arrangement which they 
find unpalatable. Some peace accords attempt to anticipate such problems by building 
safeguards or penalties for non-compliance into the agreement. The bottom line, however, is 
a strong political will to implement as agreement’’.
250  
 
Gender dimension issues are totally absent in the Accord as well as the post-accord 
institutional arrangement. We should not forget the role of women in various conflict 
resolutions and peace-building process in the world. CHT women should give more access in 
the political decision making and other negotiation process, as many argue that ‘women are 
generally more peace loving’. 
 
There was not third party involvement in the negotiation process as well as signing the 
Accord. Event the Accord does not provide for the creation of an independent neutral team to 
assess the progress of implementation. SAARC could be the best choice to play such a role in 
this regard.  
 
UNDP Baseline survey of 2009 finds that only 7.8 percent of CHT people completed primary 
education, and 2.4 percent completed secondary education. About 54 percent of the 
household heads have reported having no education. Government should take measures to 
improve the education and education should focus on constructive and positive behaviour and 
help children and adults to understand their responsibilities for building a peaceful future. In 
my fieldwork period, I found both the Bengali, and indigenous community people bear 
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‘enemy image’ in their mind, though they live in the same community for more than thirty 
years. Peace education can help to reduce ethnic religious hatred by bringing members of 
conflicting groups together in a dialogue for searching a common understanding and can help 
to replace this enemy image. 
 
UN, donor community and other international bodies can share their experiences for 
traditional conflict management, which have been used in many conflicts and can offer 














































Adnan, Shapan (2004). Migration, Land Alienation and Ethnic Conflict: Causes of Poverty in 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. Research & Advisory Services, Dhaka. 
 
Ahmed, Moudud (1995). Democracy and the Challenge of Development. University Press 
Limited. Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
 
Bleie, Tone (2005). Tribal Peoples Nationalism and the Human Rights Challenge: The 
Adivasis of Bangladesh. University Press Limited, Dhaka. 
 
Erni, Christian (ed.) (2008). The Concepts of Indigenous Peoples in Asia: A Resource Book. 
IWGIA Document No. 123, Copenhagen. 
 
Gain, Philip (ed.) (2000). The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Life and Nature at Risk. Society for 
Environment and Human Development (SHED), Dhaka. 
 
Mey, Wolfgang (ed.) (1984). Genocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. IWGIA 
Document No. 51, Copenhagen. 
 
Mohsin, Amena (1997). The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
Bangladesh. University Press Limited, Dhaka. 
 
Mohsin, Amena (2003). The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: On the Difficult Road to 
Peace. International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series. Lynne Rienner, London. 
 
Lenin, Nooh-Ul-Alam (1998). Jum Pahare Shantir Jharnadhara: Uitihashik Parbatya 
Chattagram Shantichukti (Springflow of Peace in Jum Hills? Historic CHT Accord). 
Ganoprokashan, Dhaka. 
 
Pantuliano, Sara (ed.) (2009). Uncharted Territory: Land Conflict and Humanitarian Action. 
Practical Action Publishing: UK. 
 
Roy, Rajkumari Chandra Kalindi (2000). ‘‘Land Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh’’. IWGIA Document No. 99. Copenhagen. 
 
Rubin, H.J. Rubin, I. (2005). Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data. Sage: 
London. 
 
Silverman, David (2005). Doing Qualitative Research. Sage: London. 
 
Shelley, Rahman Mizanur (1992). The Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: The Untold 






  74  
Articles 
 
Adam, Jeroen (2010). ‘‘Post-Conflict Ambon: Forced Migration and the Ethno-Territorial 
Effects of Customary Tenure’’ in Development and Change, Volume 41, Number 3, Pages 
401-419.International Institute of Social Studies. Blackwell Publishing: London. 
 
Aziz, Monis (2011). ‘‘Implementing ICT for Governance in a Post-Conflict Nation: A Case 
Study of Afghanistan’’. IGI Global.  
 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division (1983).  Chittagong H.T. District 
Statistics 1983, Ministry of Planning, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 
Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
 
Bhardwaj, Sanjay (2003). ‘‘Bangladesh Foreign Policy vis-à-vis India’’ in Strategic Analysis, 
Volume 27, Number 2, Pages 263-278. The Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses. 
 
Bigombe, Betty, Collier, Paul and Sambanis, Nicholas (2000). ‘‘Policies for Building Post-
Conflict Peace’’ in Journal of African Economics, Volume 9, Number 3, Pages 323-348. 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Boyden, Jo (2004). ‘‘Anthropology Under Fire: Ethics, Researchers and Children in War’’ in 
Boyden, Jo & Berry, de Joanna (eds.), Children and Youth on the Front Line, Ethnography, 
Armed Conflict and Displacement. Berghahn Books. 
 
Barsh, Russel Lawrence (1986). ‘‘Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International 
Law’’ in American Journal of International Law, Volume 80, Number 2, Pages 369-385. 
American Society of International Law. 
 
Carino, Jill K. (2006). ‘‘Ancestral Land, Food Sovereignty and the Right to Self-
Determination: Indigenous People’s Perspectives on Agrarian Reform’’ Porto Alegre, Brazil. 
March 7-26.  
 
Chesterman, Simon (2007). ‘‘Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in 
UN Statebuilding Operations’’ in Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Volume 1, 
Number 1, Pages 3-26. Routledge: London. 
 
Chowdhury, Khairul (2008). ‘‘Politics of Identities and Resource in Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
Bangladesh: Ethnonationalism and/or Indigenous Identity’ in Asian Journal of Social Science, 
Volume 36, Number 1, Pages 57-78. BRILL. 
 
Chowdhury, Hasina Bushra (2002). ‘‘Building Lasting Peace: Issues of the Implementation 
of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord’’. Programs in Arms Control, Disarmament and 
International Security. University of Illinois at Urban Champaign. USA. 
 
Doods, Susan (1998). ‘‘Justice and Indigenous Land Rights’’ in Inquiry, Volume 41, Issue 2, 
Pages 187-205. Routledge: London.  
Franda, Marcus (1981). ‘‘Ziaur Rahman and Bangladeshi Nationalism’’ in Economic and 
Political Weekly, Volume 16, Number 10/12, Pages 357-380. JSTOR: London.  
  75  
Ger, Güliz and Sandikci, Özlem (2006). ‘‘Doing research on sensitive topics: studying 
covered Turkish women’’ in Belk, W. Russell (ed.), Handbook of Qualitative Research 
Methods in Marketing. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK. 
 
Ghoshal, Baladas (2009). ‘‘The Anatomy of Military Interventions in Asia: The Case of 
Bangladesh’’ in India Quaterly: A Journal of International Affairs, Volume 65, Number 1, 
Pages 67-82. Sage: London. 
 
Ginty, Mac Roger (2008). ‘‘Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace’’ in 
Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Volume 
43, Number 2, Pages 139–163. Sage: London. 
 
Haque, Azizul (1980). ‘‘Bangladesh in 1980: Strains and Stresses—Opposition in the 
Doldrums.’’ in Asian Survey, Volume 21, Number 2, Pages 188-202. University of California 
Press. 
 
Hakim, Muhammad A. (1998). ‘‘Bangladesh: The beginning of the end of militarised politics? 
In Contemporary South Asia, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 283-300. Routledge: London. 
 
Hammersley, M. & Atkinson, P. (2007). Ethnography: Principles in Practice (3rd ed.). 
NewYork: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.  
 
Hartzell, Caroline A. (1999). ‘‘Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to 
Interstate Wars’’ in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 43, Number 1, Pages 3-22. Sage: 
London. 
 
Hossain, Ishtiaq (1998). ‘‘Bangladesh-India Relations: The Gangs Water-Sharing Treaty and 
Beyond’’ in Asian Affairs, Volume 25, Number 3, Pages 131-150. Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 
 
Hussain, Asaf (1976). ‘‘Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of 
Pakistan’’ in Asian Survey, Volume 16, Number 10, Pages 918-930. University of California 
Press. 
 
Islam, Nasir (1981). ‘‘Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and Bangladesh’’ in  
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 13, Number 1, Pages 55-72. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Islam, Syed Serajul (1984). ‘‘The State of Bangladesh under Zia (1975-81)’’ in Asian Survey, 
Volume 24, Number 5, Pages 556-573. University of California Press. 
 
Jamil, Ishtiaq and Panday, Pranab Kumar (2008). ‘‘The Elusive Peace Accord in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh and the Plight of the Indigenous People’’ in 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Volume 46, Number. 4, Pages 468-489. Routledge: 
London. 
 
Karabelias, Dr. Gerassimos (1998). ‘‘Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Role of the Military in the Political Transformation of Post-War Turkey and Greece: 




  76  
Marcus, Colchester (2002). ‘‘Indigenous Rights and the Collective Conscious’’in 
Anthropology Today, Volume 18, Number 1, Pages 1-3. Royal Anthropological Institute of 
Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
Mathur, Hari Mohan (2009). ‘‘Tribal Land Issues in India: Communal Management, Rights, 
and Displacement’’ in Perera, Jayantha (eds.) Land and Cultural Survival: The Communal 
Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 
 
Maniruzzaman, Talukder (1976). ‘‘Bangladesh in 1975: The Fall of the Mujib Regime and 
Its Aftermath’’ in Asian Survey, Volume 16, Number 2, Pages 119-129. University of 
California Press. 
 
Mitra, Kinsuk & Gupta, Radhika (2009). ‘‘Indigenous Peoples’ Forest Tenure in India’’ in 
Perera, Jayantha (eds.) Land and Cultural Survival: The Communal Land Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 
 
Mohsin, Amena (1998): ‘‘Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord: Looking Ahead’’ in Journal 
of Social Studies, August-October. University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
 
Molen, Pal van der & Lemmen, Christiaan (2004). ‘‘Land Administration in Post-Conflict 
Areas.’’3rd FIG Regional Conference, Jakarta, Indonesia, October 3-7.  
 
Moniruzzaman, M. (2009). ‘‘Parliamentary Democracy in Bangladesh: An Evaluation of the 
Parliament during 1991-2006’’ in Commonwealth & Comperative Politics, Volume 47, Issue 
1, Pages 100-126. Routledge: London. 
 
Norman, M. Julie (2009). ‘‘Got Trust? The Challenges of Gaining Access in Conflict Zones’’ 
in Sriram, Lekha Chandra, King, C. John, Mertus, A. Julie, Martin-Ortega, Olga and Herman, 
Johanna (eds.), Surviving Field Research: Working in violent and Difficult Situations. 
Routledge: London. 
 
Oka, Tomofumi & Shaw, Ian (2000). Qualitative Research in Social Work, Sophia University 
Press, Tokyo, Japan.   
 
Protais Musoni (2007). ‘‘Rebuilding Trust in Post-conflict Situation through Civic 
Engagement: The Experience of Rwanda’’. Paper presented at the 7th Global Forum on 
Reinventing Government; Vienna, Austria.  
 
Rasul, Golam & Thapa, Gopal B. ‘‘State Policies, Praxies and Land use in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts’’. www.sasnet.lu.se/EASASpapers/8GolamRasul.pdf  
Raj, Priscilla (1998). Insurgency Ends in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: Peace and Stability is 
the Ultimate Goal. Earth Touch. 
Rashiduzzaman, M (1998). ‘‘Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord: 
Institutional Features and Strategic Concerns’’ in Asian Survey, Volume 38, Number 7, Pages 
653-670. University of California Press. 
 
Robinson, William I. (2005). ‘‘Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation-State to 
Transnational Hegemony’’ in Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 559-574. Routledge: London. 
  77  
Roy, Raja Devasish (1997). ‘‘The Population Transfer Programme of 1980s and the Land 
Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts’’in Subir Bhaumik et al (eds.) 
Living on the Edge: Essays on the Chittagong Hill Tracts. South Asia Forum for Human 
Rights, Kathmandu. 
 
Roy, Raja Devasish (2000). ‘‘The Land Question and the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord’’ in 
Victoria Tauli Corpuz et al (eds.), The Chittagong Hill Tracts: The Road to a Lasting Peace, 
Tebtebba Foundation, Baguio City, Philippines. 
 
Roy, Raja Devasish (2002). ‘‘Land and Forest Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
Bangladesh.’’ International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), 
Kathmandu, Nepal.  
 
Roy, Raja Devasish (2002). Background Study on the Chittagong Hill Tracts Land Situation. 
CARE Bangladesh.  
 
Roy, Raja Devasish (2004). ‘‘Challenges for Juridical Pluralism and Customary Laws of 
Indigenous Peoples: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh’’ in Arizona Journal 
of International & Comparative Law, Volume 21, Number 1, Pages 113-182. 
 
Roy, Raja Devasish (2008). ‘‘The Chittagong Hill Tracts ‘‘Peace Accord’’: Whose Peace? in 
Frontier Encounters: Indigenous Communities and Settlers in Asia and Latin America. 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. Document No. 120. 
 
Schendel, Van Willem (1992). ‘‘The Invention of the Jummas: State Formation and Ethnicity 
in Southeastern Bangladesh’’ in Modern Asian Studies, Volume 26, Number 1, Pages 95-128. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Scheye, Eric & Peake, Gordon (2005). ‘‘Unknotting Local Ownership’’ in Ebnother, Anja H. 
& Fluri, Philip (eds.), After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict 
Societies From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership. Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). 
Sikri, Veena (2009). ‘‘India-Bangladesh Relations: The Way Ahead’’ in India Quarterly: A 
Journal of International Affairs, Volume 65, Number 2, Pages 153-165. Sage: London.  
Simmons, S. Cynthia (2004). ‘‘The Political Economy of Land Conflict in the Eastern 
Brazilian Amazon’’ in Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Volume 94, 
Number 1, Pages 183-206.  Blackwell Publishing: London. 
Sorbo, Gunnar M. (2004). ‘‘Peacebuilding in Post-War Situations: Lessons for Sudan’’ Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, Norway. 
Tripura, Sontosh Bikash (2008). ‘‘Blaming Jhum, Denying Jhumia: Challenges for 
Indigenous Peoples Land Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh, A Case 
Study on Chakma and Tripura’’ Master Thesis. University of Tromso, Norway. 
Unruh, Jon D (2002). ‘‘Local Land Tenure in the Peace Process’’ in Peace Review, Volume 
14, Issue 3, Pages 337-342. Routledge: London. 
 
  78  
Unruh, Jon D (2003). ‘‘Land Tenure and Legal Pluralism in The Peace Process’’ in Peace & 
Change, Volume 28, No. 3. Peace History Society and Peace and Justice Studies Association. 
 
Unruh, Jon D (2004). ‘‘Land and Property Rights in the Peace Process’’ in Beyond 
Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, 
University of Colorado. http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/land_tenure/ 
 
Wilson, Michael (1996). ‘‘Asking Question’’ in Sapsford, Roger & Jupp, Victor (eds.), Data 
Collection and Analysis. Sage: London. 
 
Zafarullah, Habib & Akhter, Muhammad Yeahia (2001). ‘‘Military Rule, Civilianisation and 
Electoral Corruption: Pakistan and Bangladesh in Perspective’’ in Asian Studies Review, 




Asian Centre for Human Rights.  http://www.achrweb.org/press/2010/BD02-2010.html 
 
Anti Corruption Commission Bangladesh. http://acc.org.bd/about.php 
 
Bangladesh Election Commission. www.ecs.gov.bd/English/index.php 
 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (2009). Socio-Economic Baseline Survey of 




Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (2000). Life is not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh, Update 4. www.iwgia.org  
 
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti. www.pcjss-cht.org 
 
Right to Information Act, 2009. http://www.moi.gov.bd/RTI/RTI_English.pdf 
 
Transparency International Bangladesh. www.ti-bangladesh.org 
 
The Daily Star. http://www.thedailystar.net; The New Age. http://newagebd.come 
 
The Prothom Alo. http://www.prothom-alo.com 
 
UN DESA Discussion Paper-GPAB/REGOPA Cluster (2007). Governance Strategies for 
Post Conflict Reconstruction, Sustainable Peace and Development  
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan028332.pdf 
 
United Nations Development Programme (2005). Bangladesh: A Critical Review of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord. 
www.regionalcentrebangkok.undp.or.th/practices/governance/documents/Bangladesh_000.pdf 
 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip/html 
 
USAID (2005). Land and Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention. 
www.usaid.gov/.../conflict/.../CMM_Land_and_Conflict_Toolkit_April_2005.pdf 
  79  
Appendix I 
Full Text of the CHT Peace Accord 1997 
 
English Translation as published by Daily Star Internet Edition Volume 1 Number 113 
December 03, 1997   
 
Keeping full and unswerved allegiance in Bangladesh's state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity in Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts region under the jurisdiction of the 
Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the National Committee on Chittagong 
Hill Tracts, on behalf of the government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, and 
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti, on behalf of the inhabitants of Chittagong Hill 
Tracts, reached the following agreement in four parts (namely: Ka, Kha, Ga, Gha) to uphold 
the political, social, cultural, educational and economic rights of all the people of Chittagong 
Hill Tracts region, to expedite socio-economic development process and to preserve 
respective the rights of all the citizens of Bangladesh and their development.  
 
(Ka) General:  
 
1. Both the sides recognised the need for protecting the characteristics and attaining 
overall development of the region considering Chittagong Hill Tracts as a tribal 
inhabited region.  
2. Both the parties have decided to formulate, change, amend and incorporate concerned 
acts, regulations and practices as soon as possible in keeping with the consensus and 
responsibility expressed in different sections of the agreement.   
3. An implementation committee will be formed to monitor the implementation process 
of the agreement with the following members:  
      Ka) A member nominated by the Prime Minister: Convenor  
      Kha) Chairman of the task force formed under the purview of the agreement: 
member  
      Ga) President of Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti: member  
4. The agreement will come into effect from the date of its signing and execution by 
both the sides. This agreement will be valid from the date of its effect until all the 
steps are executed as per the agreement.  
 
(Kha) Chittagong Hill Tracts Local Government Council/Hill District Council: 
  
Both the sides have reached agreement with regard to changing, amending, incorporating and 
writing off the existing Parbatya Zila Sthanio Sarkar Parishad Ain 1989 (Rangamati Parbatya 
Zila Sthanio Sarkar Parishad Ain 1989, Bandarban Parbatya Zila Sthanio Sarkar Parishad Ain 
1989, Khagrachhari Parbatya Zila Sthanio Sarkar Parishad Ain 1989) and its different clauses 
before this agreement comes into force.  
 
1. The word "tribal" used in different clauses of the Parishad Ain will stay.   
2. The name "Parbatya Zila Sthanio Sarkar Parishad" will be amended and the name of 
parishad will be "Parbatya Zila Parishad."   
3. "Non-tribal permanent residents" will mean those who are not a tribal but have legal 
lands and generally live in Hill Districts at specific addresses.   
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4. Ka) There will be 3 (three) seats for women in each of the Parbatya Zila Parishad. 
One third (1/3) of these seats will be for non-tribals.  
Kha) 1, 2, 3 and 4 sub-clauses of clause 4 will remain in force as per the original act.  
Ga) The words "deputy commissioner" and "deputy commissioner's" in the second 
line of sub-clause (5) of clause 4 will be replaced by "circle chief" and "circle chief's".  
Gha) the following sub-clause will be incorporated in clause 4 "The concerned circle 
office will ascertain whether a person is non-tribal or not on the basis of submission 
of certificate given by concerned mouza headman/union parishad 
chairman/pourashabha chairman and no non-tribal person can become the non-tribal 
candidate without the certificate received from the circle officer regarding this."  
5. In the clause 7 it has been stated that the chairman or any other elected member will 
have to take oath or give declaration before Chittagong Divisional Commissioner 
before taking over office. Amending this in place of "Chittagong Divisional 
Commissioner," the members will take oath or give declaration before "any High 
Court Division Judge."  
6. The words "to Chittagong Divisional Commissioner" will be replaced by "as per 
election rules" in the fourth line of clause 8.  
7. The words "three years" will be replace by "five years" in the second line of clause 10.  
8. In clause number 14 there will be provision that a tribal member elected by other 
members of the Parishad will chair and discharge other responsibilities if the post of 
chairman falls vacant or in his absence. 
9. The existing clause number 17 will be replaced by the following sentences: A person 
will be considered eligible to be enlisted in the voters list if he/she (1) is a 
Bangladeshi citizen (2) he/she is not below the 18 years (3) appropriate court has not 
declared him mentally sick (4) he/she is a permanent resident of Hill District.  
10. In sub-clause 2 of clause number 20 the words "delimitations of constituencies" will 
be incorporated independently.  
11. In sub-clause 2 of clause 25 there will be a provision that the chairman of all the 
meetings of the Parishad or a tribal member elected by other members of the Parishad 
will chair meetings and discharge other responsibilities if the post of chairman falls 
vacant or in his absence. 
12. As the entire region of Khagrachhari District is not included in the Mong circle, the 
words "Khagrachhari Mong Chief" in clause number 26 of Khagrachhari Parbatya 
Zila Sthanio Sarkar Parishad Ain will be replaced by the words "Mong circle chief 
and Chakma circle chief." Similarly, there will be scope for the presence of Bomang 
chief in the meetings of Rangamati Parbatya Zila Parishad. In the same way, there 
will be provision that the Bomang circle chief can attend the meetings of Bandarban 
Parbatya Zila Parishad meetings if he wishes or invited to join.  
13. In sub-clause (1) and sub-clause (2) of clause 31 there will be a provision that a chief 
executive officer of the status of a deputy secretary will be there as secretary in a 
Parishad and the tribal officials will get priority in this post.  
14. Ka) In sub clause (1) of clause 32 there will be a provision that the Parishad will be 
able to create new posts for different classes of officers and employees for properly 
conducting the activities of the Parishad.  
Kha) The sub-clause 2 of clause 32 will be amended as follows: The Parishad can, 
according to rules, recruit class three and four employees and can transfer, suspend, 
terminate or given any other punishment. But condition would be that in case of such 
appointments the tribal residents of the District will be given priority.  
Ga) As per sub-clause (3) of clause 32, the government, in consultation with the 
Parishad, may appoint officers for the other posts and there will be legal provision to 
removed, suspend or terminate or penalise officers as per the government rules.  
  81  
15. 'As per rules' will be mentioned in Sub-clause (3) of Rule 33.  
16. In the third line of Sub-clause (1) of Rule 36, the words "or in any way devised by the 
government" will be deleted.  
17. Ka) The principal clause of the 'fourth' of Sub-clause (One) of Clause 37 will be valid.  
Kha) "As per rules "will be included in Sub-clause (2), Gha, of Rule 37. 
18. Sub-clause (3) of clause 38, will be cancelled and sub-clause (4) will be amended in 
conformity with the following text, "a new budget can be prepared and approved, if 
needed, at any time, before the completion of the previous financial year."  
19. Rules 42 will incorporate the following sub-clause: "The parishad, with the allocated 
money from the government, will receive, initiate or implement any development 
project in the transferred subjects and all national level development programmes will 
be implemented through the parishad by the concerned ministries/divisions/ 
organisations."  
20. The word "Parishad" will replace the word "government" in the second line of Sub-
clause (2) of Rule 45.  
21. Rules 50, 51, and 52 will be repealed and following clauses will be introduced:  
"If needed, the government will give advice or regulatory directives for streamlining 
the Parishad activities with the objectives of the aforesaid rules."  
"The government, if the government receives any hard evidence that any activity or 
proposed activity of the Parishad is violating the aforesaid rules or is inconsistent with 
it, will have the authority to ask for written information along with explanation. The 
government will also have the authority to give advice or directives in this regard."  
22. "Within 90 days of abolition of the Parishad" shall be read in place of "after the 
expiry of defunct period" before the words "the act" under clause 53 sub-clause (3).  
23. The word 'government' will be replaced by the word "ministry" in the third and fourth 
lines in clause 61.  
24. (A) sub-clause (1) in clause 62 will be replaced by the following:  
Whatever be the provisions in the currently prevailing laws, Hill Districts police sub-
inspector and below shall be appointed by the Parishad as per the prescribed rules and 
the Parishad will transfer, and take action against them as per the prescribed rules.  
However, the condition will be that tribals of the District will get preference in case of 
this appointment.  
25. The words "supports will be provided" will remain in third line in clause 63.  
26. Clause 64 will be amended as follows:  
a) Whatever exists in the currently prevailing laws, without prior permission of the 
parishad, no lands, including leasable khas lands in the District, can be leased out, 
sold, purchased or transferred.  
However, it will not be applicable in case of the reserved forest, Kaptai 
Hydroelectricity Project area, Betbunia Satellite Station area, state-owned industrial 
enterprises and lands recorded in the name of the government.  
b) Whatever exists in the currently prevailing other laws, the government cannot 
acquire or transfer any lands, Hills and forests under the jurisdictions of the Hill 
District Parishad without prior discussion and approval of the Parishad.  
Ga) The Parishad may supervise or control the work of headmen, chairman, amin, 
surveyors, kanungo and assistant commissioners (land).  
Gha) The fringe land of Kaptai lake will be leased out on priority basis to their 
original owners.  
27. Clause 65 will be amended to formulate the following: For the time being, whatever 
law is in force, the land development tax of the District will be in the hand of the 
Parishad and the tax to be collected on that account will be in the fund of the Parishad.  
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28. Clause 67 will be amended to formulate the following: Parishad and the government 
will raise specific proposals if it is necessary for the co-ordination of the Parishad and 
the government, and co-ordination of work will be done through mutual consultations. 
29. Sub-clause (1) of Clause 68 will be amended to formulate the following sub-clause:  
With a view to fulfilling the objectives of this law, the government will be able to 
prepare rules after discussion with the Parishad through gazette notification. Even 
after the formulation of any rule, the Parishad will have the right to appeal to the 
government for re-consideration of such rules.  
30. Ka) In the first and second paragraphs of sub-clause (1) of Clause 69, the words 
"prior approval of the government" will be dropped and following part will be added 
after the words "should be done" in the third para:  
It is conditional that if the government disagrees with any part of the provision 
formulated then the government will be able to provide suggestions or directives 
regarding the provision.  
Kha) In the (Ja) of sub-clause (2) of Clause 69 the words "the power of the chairman 
will be given to any officers of the parishad" will be dropped.  
31. Clause 70 will be deleted. 
32. Clause 79 will be amended to formulate the following section:  
The Parishad will be able to make written appeal to the government in case it feels 
that a law passed by the Jatiya Sangsad or any other authority is difficult for the 
District or objectionable for the tribals after stating the reasons of the difficulty or 
objection and the government may take appropriate steps for redressal as per the 
appeal.  
33. Ka) The word supervision will be added after "discipline" in the schedule number one 
on the activities of the Parishad.  
Kha) The activities of the Parishad mentioned in number three will be added with the 
following:  
(1) Vocational education, (2) Primary education in mother tongue (3) Secondary 
education.  
Ga) The words 'reserved' or will be dropped from the first schedule of the activities of 
Parishad and sub-clause 6 (Kha).  
34. The following subjects will be included in the functions and responsibilities of the 
Hill District parishads:  
(Ka) Land and land management, (Kha) Police (local), (Ga) Tribal law and social 
justice, (Gha) Youth welfare, (Uma) Environmental protection and development, 
(Cha) Local tourism, (Chha) improvement trust and other local government 
institutions, Barring paurashabha and union parishads, (Ja) Issue of licence to local 
industries and business, barring Kaptai water resources, proper use and irrigation of 
other rivers and canals and beels, (Jha) Preservation of statistics of birth and deaths, 
(Ta) Business transactions and (Tha) Jhum cultivation.  
35. The following subjects and sources will be included for imposition of taxes, rate, toll 
and fees by the Parishad stated in the second schedule:  
(Ka) Registration fee of manual vehicles, (Kha) Tax on buying and selling of 
commodities, (Ga) Holding tax on land and buildings, (Gha) Tax on domestic 
animals, (Uma) Fees of social judgement, (Cha) Holding tax on government and non-
government industries, Chha) A portion of royalty on forest resources, (Ja) 
Supplementary tax on cinema, jatra and circus, (Jha) Partial royalty of contracts by 
government for search and exploration of mineral resources, (Neo) Tax on business, 
(Ta) Tax on Lottery, (Tha) Tax on catching fish.  
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(Ga) Hill Tracts Regional Parishad 
  
1. A regional council will be formed combining the three Hill Districts local government 
parishad through amending some clause of three Hill Districts Local Government 
Parishad Act 1989 with a view to strengthening and making them effective.  
2. Chairman of the parishad will be indirectly elected by the elected members of the 
parishad. The chairman will enjoy the status of a state minister and he must be a tribal.  
3. The parishad will consist of 22 members, including its chairman. Two-thirds of the 
members will be elected from the tribals.  Following is the structure of the parishad:  
- Chairman one, Member (tribal) male 12, Member (tribal) female 2, Member 
(non-tribal) 6, Member (non-tribal) female one.    
- Among the total male tribal members, five will be elected from the Chakma 
tribe, three from Marma, two from Tripura and one from Morang and 
Tangchongya    
- Two persons will be elected from every District from the non-tribal male 
members. In the case of tribal female members, one from the Chakma tribe 
and one from the other tribes will be elected.  
4. Three seats will be reserved from women in the council of which one-third will be 
non-tribal.  
5. The members of the council will be elected indirectly by the elected members of the 
three Hill District councils. Chairman of the three Hill Districts will be the ex-officio 
members of the council and they will have the voting right. The eligibility and non-
eligibility of the candidates for the membership of the council will be similar to that 
of the members of the Hill District Council.  
6. The tenure of the council will be five years. Budget preparation and its approval, 
dissolution of council, formulation of council's regulation, appointment of and control 
over officers and employees and matters related to concerned subject and procedures 
will be similar to the subjects and procedures given in favour of and applicable for the 
Hill District Council.  
7. A principal executive officer equivalent to the Joint Secretary of the government will 
be appointed in the council and the tribal candidates will be given preference in the 
appointment of the post.  
8. a) If the chairman's post of the council remains vacant, a chairman will be elected 
indirectly from the other tribal members of the council by the members of the three 
Hill District councils for an interim period.   
b) If any post of the member of the council remains vacant for any reason, it will be 
filled by by-election.   
9. a) All the development activities under the direction of three Hill District councils 
will be coordinated by the council, including overall supervision and co-ordination of 
the matters under the jurisdiction of the three Hill District council. The decision of the 
regional council will be considered final in case of any conflict or lack of co-
ordination in discharging the duties vested upon the three Hill District council.   
b) The council will coordinate and supervise the local councils, including the 
municipalities.  
c) The regional council may coordinate and supervise the general administration, law 
and order and matters related to the development of the three Hill Districts.  
d) The council may provide direction in the disaster management and relief 
programme, including co-ordination of the NGOs' activities.  
e) Tribal rules and social justice will be under the jurisdiction of the regional council.  
f) The council may provide licence for heavy industries.  
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10. Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board will discharge the given duties under the 
general and overall supervision of the council. The government will give preference 
to the eligible tribal candidates in appointing the chairman of the development board.  
11. If any contradiction is observed between the Chittagong Hill Tracts Administrative 
Rules of 1900 and other related laws, acts and ordinances and the Local Government 
Council Law of 1989, it will be settled as per the advice and the proposals of the 
regional council.   
12. The government may form an interim regional council and give it the responsibilities 
of the council until and unless the regional council is formed on the basis of direct and 
indirect election.  
13. The government may formulate any law regarding Chittagong Hill Tracts subject to 
discussion with the regional council and that will be done as per the advice of the 
council.   
14. Fund of the council will be formed from the following sources:  
a) Finance received from the District council fund.  
b) Finance and profits from all the property which have been provided and directed by 
the council.  
c) Loan and grants from the government and other authorities.  
d) Grants provided by any institution or person.  
e) Profit from the financial investment of the council.  
f) Any of the finance received by the council.  
g) Finance received from other sources of income provided to the council as per the 
direction of the government.  
 
Gha) Rehabilitation, general amnesty and other issues: 
 
Both sides have reached the following position and agreed to take programmes for restoring 
normal situation in Chittagong Hill Tracts area and to this end on the matters of rehabilitation, 
general amnesty and others related issues and activities.  
 
1. An agreement was signed between the government and the tribal refugee leaders on 
March 9, 1997 at Agartala of Tripura state on bringing back the tribal refugees 
staying in the state of Tripura. Under this agreement, repatriation of tribal refugees 
began on March 28, 1997. This process will continue and the leaders of the PCJSS 
will extend all possible co-operation in this regard. The internal refugees of the three 
Hill Districts will be rehabilitated through their proper identification by a task force.   
2. The land record and right of possession of the tribal people will be ascertained after 
finalisation of the ownership of land of the tribal people. And to achieve this end, the 
government will start land survey in Chittagong Hill Tracts and resolve all disputes 
relating to land through proper scrutiny and verification in consultation with the 
regional councils to be formed under this agreement. These steps will be taken soon 
after signing and implementation of this agreement between the government and the 
PCJSS and rehabilitation of the tribal refugees and internal tribal refugees.   
3. The government will ensure leasing two acres of land in the respective locality 
subject to availability of land of the landless tribals or the tribals having less than two 
acres of land per family. However, groveland can be allotted in case of non-
availability of necessary lands.   
4. A commission (Land Dispute Resolution Commission) will be constituted under a 
retired judge for the disposal of all disputes relating to lands. Besides settlement of 
the land disputes of the rehabilitated tribal, this commission will have full power to 
annul all rights of ownership on land and Hills which have so far been given illegal 
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settlements or encroached illegally. No appeal can be made against the verdict of this 
commission and the decision of this commission will be treated as final. This will be 
implied in case of fringe land.  
5. This commission will be constituted with the following members:  
Ka) Retired judge:  
Kha) Circle chief (concerned):  
Ga) Chairman representative of the regional council  
Gha) Divisional commissioner/additional commissioner  
Uma) Chairman of the District council (concerned).  
6. Ka) The tenure of the commission will be of three years. But the tenure can be 
extended in consultations with the regional council.  
Kha) The commission will resolve disputes on the basis of existing laws, customs and 
systems of Chittagong Hill Tracts.  
7. The loans, which were obtained by repatriated tribals from government agencies but 
could not properly utilised owing to conflicting situation, will be exempted with full 
interest.  
8. Rubber plantation and allotment of other lands: The allotments of lands to non-tribals 
and non-residents for rubber cultivation and other purposes but not yet utilised the 
lands for the projects properly during the last ten years will be cancelled.  
9. The government will allocate additional finance on priority basis for taking up 
maximum number of projects to develop Chittagong Hill Tracts. Projects will be 
implemented on priority basis for construction of infrastructure for the development 
of the region and the government will allocate necessary funds for this purpose. The 
government will encourage development of tourism for local and foreign tourists, 
taking into consideration the environmental aspect of the region.  
10. Reservation of quota and allocation of scholarships: The government will continue 
the quota system for the tribals in case of government jobs and higher education till 
they reach at par with the people of other regions of the country. With this aim in 
view the government will provide more scholarships for tribal boys/girls in 
educational institutions. The government will provide necessary scholarships for 
taking education abroad and research pursuit.  
11. The government and the elected representatives will be active to preserve the 
distinctiveness of the tribal culture and heritage. The government will provide due 
patronisation and assistance for expansion of tribal cultural activities at par with that 
of the mainstream of the national life.  
12. The PCJSS will submit to the government within 45 days of signing of this agreement 
the full list of its armed members and description and accounts of all arms and 
weapons under its control and possession.  
13. The government and the PCJSS will jointly decide the day, date and place for 
depositing arms by the PCJSS within 45 days of signing of this agreement. The 
government will ensure all kinds of security for the members of the listed members of 
the PCJSS and their families for coming back to normal life after declaring the day, 
date and place for depositing arms by the listed members of the PCJSS.  
14. The government will declare amnesty for those members who will deposit arms and 
ammunition on the scheduled date. The government will withdraw cases lodged 
earlier against those persons.  
15. The government will take legal action against those who will not deposit arms and 
ammunition within the stipulated time.  
16. General amnesty will be given to all PCJSS members after they return to normal life 
and this amnesty will also be given to all the permanent residents who were connected 
with the PCJSS activities.  
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Ka) Each family of the repatriated members of the PCJSS will be given Taka 50,000 
in cash at a time for their rehabilitation.  
Kha) All cases, warrants of arrest, held against any armed member or general member 
of the PCJSS will be withdrawn and punishment given after trial in absentia will be 
exempted after surrender of arms and coming back to normal life as soon as possible. 
The members of the PCJSS, if they are in jail, will be released.  
Ga) Similarly, no cases will be filed or no punishment be given to any person for 
mere being the members of the PCJSS after surrendering arms and coming back to 
normal life.  
Gha) The loans obtained by the members of the PCJSS from any government banks 
or other agencies but could not be utilised owing to conflicting situation would be 
exempted with interest.  
Uma) Those members of the PCJSS who were employed in various government jobs 
would be absorbed in their respective posts and the eligible members of their family 
will be given jobs as per their qualifications. In such cases, the government principles 
regarding relaxation of age will be followed.  
Cha) Bank loans on soft term will be given to the members of the PCJSS for cottage 
industry and horticulture and other such self-employment generating activities.  
Chha) Educational facilities will be provided for the children of the PCJSS and the 
certificates obtained from foreign board and educational institutions will be 
considered as valid.  
17. Ka) Immediately with signing and executing the agreement between the government 
and the PCJSS and with the members of the PCJSS coming to normal life, all 
temporary camps of army, ansar and village defence force in Chittagong Hill Tracts 
excepting Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) and permanent cantonments (three in three 
District headquarters and in Alikadam, Ruma and Dighinala) will be gradually 
brought back to the permanent places and a deadline for this will be fixed. The 
members of the armed forces can be deployed under due rules and procedures in case 
of deterioration of law and order situation and in times of natural calamities or like 
other parts of the country under the control of the civil administration. The regional 
council may request the appropriate authorities for such help and assistance in case of 
such a necessity and in due time.  
Kha) The lands to be abandoned by military or para-military camps and cantonments 
will be either returned to the original owners or to the Hill District councils.  
18. The permanent residents of Chittagong Hill Tracts with priority to the tribals will be 
given appointment to all categories of officers and employees of all government, 
semi-government, parishad and autonomous bodies of Chittagong Hill Tracts. In case 
of absence of eligible persons among the permanent residents of Chittagong Hill 
Tracts for particular posts, the government may give appointment on lien or for a 
definite period to such posts.  
19. A ministry on Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs will be set up appointing one minister 
from the tribals. The following advisory committee will be constituted to assist this 
ministry:  
1) The Minister in charge of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs,  
2) Chairman/representative, regional council,  
3) Chairman/representative, Rangamati Hill District Council,  
4) Chairman/representative, Khagrachhari Hill District Council,  
5) Chairman/representative, Bandarban Hill District Council,  
6) MP, Rangamati, 7) MP, Khagrachhari, 8) MP, Bandarban, 9) Chakma Raja (King), 
10) Bomang Raja, 11) Mong Raja, and 12) Three non-tribal members to be nominated 
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This agreement is prepared in Bangla and completed and signed in Dhaka on Agrahayan 18, 





On behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh  
Sd/illegible  
(Abul Hasanat Abdullah) 
Convenor,  





On behalf of the residents of Chittagong Hill Tracts  
Sd/illegible  
(Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma)  
President,  
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Appendix II 
 
System of Land Grants in the CHT 
(Rule 34, CHT Regulation, 1900) 
 
 
1. No settlement of Government khas land shall be made in the District of Chittagong Hill 
Tracts except to extent and in the manner specified below:- 
(a) (i) The quantity of cultivated flat land to be settled for plough cultivation with a 
single family of Hillmen or non-Hillmen resident shall be such as added to the 
quantity of such land already in its possession does not exceed 5 acres. In addition to 
the flat land for plough cultivation land for grove plantation not exceeding 5 acres 
may be settled with such family; but in a case where the performance of a lessee is 
found by the Deputy Commissioner to be highly satisfactory, a further quantity of 
land for grove plantation may be settled with such family so that the quantity of land 
for grove plantation already in his profession, does not exceed 10 acres. Settlement of 
land for plough cultivation or grove plantation under this sub-clause shall be free of 
salami. 
 
   (ii) A lease for plough cultivation and grove cultivation under sub-clause (I) shall be 
granted by the Deputy Commissioner; 
 
Provided that lease of land only for plough cultivation may be granted to a cultivating 
Hillman by the Sub-Divisional Officer. An application of a Hillman for lease of plough land 
may be made to the headman who will forward it to the Sub-Division Officer with his 
recommendation. 
 
(iii) The rent for plough land leased out under sub-clause (I) shall be assessed at the 
usual rate of raiyati rent by the authority who grants the lease: 
 
Provided that when any land, which had not been cultivated before, is so leased 
out, no rent shall be payable for the first three years of the lease. 
    
(iv) The grove land leased out under sub-clause (I) shall be rent-free for the first three 
years and shall be assessed to rent as third class land for the next three years followed 
by an assessment to be made by the Deputy Commissioner in accordance with the 
produce of the land. 
 
Explanation- In this sub-rule, “grove land” means flat land and includes such foothill land as 
would not require terracing, full or modified, to be utilized solely for plantation of fruit trees 
and other trees. 
 
(b) (i) land for rubber plantation and other plantation on commercial basis may be settled 
with a person on long term lease basis by the Deputy Commissioner upto 25 acres and 
by the Commissioner upto 100 acres. Settlement of land exceeding 100 acres shall not 
be made with the prior sanction of the Government. 
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Salami for settlement of land under this clause shall be charged at 100 percent of market 
value, 10 percent of which shall be payable in the first year and the balance shall be payable 
at 5 percent in the 8th to the 17th year and 10 percent in the 18th to 21st year. 
 
Provided that in the case of Hillmen and non-Hillmen residents salami for lease upto 
25 acres shall be charged at 50 percent of market value, 5 percent of which shall be 
payable in the first year and the balance shall be payable at 2 and half percent in the 
8th to 17th year and 5 percent in the 18th to 21st year. 
 
(ii) Usual raiyati rate of rent shall be payable for the land settled under this clause 
from the date of execution of the lease deed. 
 
(c) (i) Land upto 10 acres outside urban areas may be settled by the Deputy 
Commissioner with a deserving industrialist on long term lease basis for 
establishment of industrial plants. Salami for such settlement shall be charged at 100 
percent of market value and shall be payable at the time of settlement. In the case of 
lessees who are Hillmen or non-Hillmen residents the salami shall be charged at 50 
percent of market value. 
 
(ii) Rent per acre of land settled under this clause shall be assessed at half percent of 
market value. 
 
(d) (i) Land for residential purposes may be settled by the Deputy Commissioner with 
deserving persons on long term lease basis. In urban areas, salami from Hillmen and 
non-Hillmen residents for such land shall be charged at 50 percent of market value 
and shall be payable at the time of settlement. In the case of a lease granted to any 
person other than Hillmen or non-Hillmen residents salami for such land shall be 
charged at 100 percent of market value. No salami shall, however, be charged from 
Hillmen and non-Hillmen residents for settlement under this clause of land outside 
urban areas. 
 
(ii) Rent per acre of land settled under this clause shall be assessed at one fourth 
percent of market value. 
 
(iii) Land exceeding 30 acres in an urban area for residential purpose shall not be 
settled with any person without prior approval of the Government. 
 
(e)  The Deputy Commissioner may, in accordance with such plan as may be approved 
by the Government, settle with a person land in an urban area for commercial purpose. 
The salami for such land shall be changed- 
 
(i) at 50 percent, of market value in the case of Hillmen and non-Hillmen 
residents; and   
(ii) at 100 percent, of market value in the case of others. 
 
Rent per acre of land settled under this clause shall be assessed at half percent, of 
market value. 
 
(f) Market value for the purpose of the aforesaid clause shall be determined in such 
manner as may by specified by the Government from time to time. 
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(g) All settlements of khas lands shall be concluded in the form of a lease deed prescribed 
or to be prescribed by the Government and shall be registered under rule 12. The 
rights and liabilities of the lessees of the lessees shall be governed by such terms and 
conditions as may be set forth in the lessee deed.251 
 
(2) The Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, exempt any area 
from the operation of sub-rule (I) for the purpose of reclamation of culturable waste lands 
in such area with a view to bringing them under cultivation and when any area has been 
so exempted, lands in the area shall notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in 
these rules, be dealt with in such manner as the provincial Govt. may by general or 
special orders, from time direct. 
 
(3) (a) Sub-tenants of whatever grade in existence on 3rd December 1920 and recognized by 
the Deputy Commissioner shall not be evicted except in accordance with sub-rule (8) nor 
their rent be enhanced except with the permission of the Deputy Commissioner. 
(b) Whenever any recognized sub-lessee terminate for any reason, the immediate landlord 
of the sub-lessee had a tenant under him, that tenant shall continue on the terms on which 
he holds. 
(4) No lessee or sub-lessee shall be allowed to sub-let the whole or any part of his land. 
 
(5) No lessee or sub-lessee shall be allowed to transfer by sale, gift or mortgage the whole or 
any part of his holding without the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner, who may 
no sanction any mortgage other than usufructuary mortgage to extend for a period not 
exceeding seven years and to provide for the extinction of the whole debt including principle 
and interest within that period subject to the condition that the mortgage will not  in any 
event, be extended beyond that period, provided that the Deputy Commissioner may sanction 
a simple mortgage in favor of Government, or the Agriculture Development Bank of Pakistan 
or the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan or Co-operative Societies, registered under 
the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 (Bengal Act XXI of 1940) or the east Pakistan 
Agriculture Development Co-operation or any other loan giving agency for such period and 
subject to such conditions as he may deem fit. The Deputy Commissioner may, however, 
sanction mortgage of any holding to the East Pakistan Agriculture Development corporation 
for loans in ready advanced prior to the date of publication of this notification. Unauthorized 
transfer, will, in no instance, be recognized. 
 
(6) In all cases of unauthorized sub-lease or transfer, the Deputy Commissioner shall resume 
the land sublet or transferred and may either hold it khas or lease it out with the lessor or 
transferor, or with the lessee or transferee, or with any other person according to 
circumstance and the provision in the sub-rule (1). 
(7) No permition of a holding shall be made without the consent of the Deputy Commissioner. 
                                                 
251 As amended by Notification No. S.R.O.72-L/79,dated 31March, 1979, published at pages 1178, 1179, 1180 
of the Bangladesh Gazette Extra, March 31, 1979. 
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(8) A sub-tenant recognized by the Deputy Commissioner is not liable to ejectment except by 
his order. A sub-tenant will ordinarily be ejected- 
(a) If the sublets or transfers any part of his holding or fails to show diligence or 
keeping the holding under cultivation; 
(b) If he fails to pay an arrear or rent recorded or fixed by Deputy Commissioner; 
(c) If he uses the holding in any manner that renders it unfit for the purposed of the 
tenancy; 
(d) If he enhances the rent of a recognized sub-tenant under him without permission 
of the Deputy Commissioner. 
 
(9) The rent of a sub-tenant of any grade recognized by the Deputy Commissioner cannot be 
enhanced except the Deputy Commissioner. The rent of such a sub-tenant shall enhanced if 
the rent for the land held by him exceeds the rent paid by the landlord or, if the rent of the 
landlord is also under enhancement, the rent settled as payable by the landlord, by more than 
50 percent except for special reasons to be recorded by the Deputy Commissioner in writing. 
The rent of such a sub-tenant may, may subject to this condition be enhanced by Deputy 
Commissioner up to such limit as he consider fair and equitable, on the application of the 
landlord, if the rent of the sub-tenant has been enhanced during the ten years previous to the 
application. 
(10) Sub-tenants of whatever grade who have been recognized by the Deputy Commissioner 
shall have, subject to the provisions of the rules regarding ejectment and resumption, 
permanent and heritable rights in the land for which they pay rent. 
(11) A tenant directly under government shall have permanent and heritable rights in the land 
for which he pays rent unless there is a define contract that his right is not permanent or 
heritable, subject to the provision contained in these rules for his lease, if any, regarding 
resumption; 
Provided that he shall be liable to ejectment- 
(i) If he fails to pay an arrear of rent recorded or fixed by the Deputy Commissioner; 
or  
(ii) If he uses the land in any manner which renders it unfit for the purpose of the 
tenancy, or 
(iii) If in accordance with the terms of his lease, if any, he is liable to be ejected or the 
lease is cancelled any other reason; 
 
Provided also that is in accordance with the terms of the lease or license under which the 
tenant was allowed to hold the land, all lands not kept under cultivation were liable to 
resumption, such lands shall be still so liable even though the period of such lease has the 
tenant continues to hold the land. 
 
(12) The power of ejectment of a tenant or resumption of any land under sub-rule (II) shall be 
exercised by the Deputy Commissioner. 
 
(13) Nothing in these rules, or any grant, lease or contract under which land is held in the Hill 
Tracts shall operate to permit the inheritance of any Hill Tracts land by non-residents of the 
District except with the express consent of the Deputy Commissioner who in giving his 
consent shall have regards to the principal of equity and as far as may be to the rights of 
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plainsmen which but for this rule would be operative. An appeal from such orders of the 
Deputy Commissioner shall lie to the Commissioner. 
(14) The provisions of sub-rules (5), (6), (7), (11), and (13) will apply to existing tenancies 
only. 
(15) The powers of the Deputy Commissioner under this rule may also be exercised by the 
Additional Deputy Commissioner. 
(16) The powers of the Deputy Commissioner under this rule may also be exercised by the 
Sub-divisional Officers concerned in their respective jurisdiction if so expressly authorized 
by the Deputy Commissioner by order in writing to exercise such powers. 
EXPLANATION- For the purpose of this rule, family shall include the lessee, his wife, sons, 
daughters and any other relations dependent on the lessee and living in the same mess.252     
 
































                                                 
252 As amended by Notification No 1L-15/69/216-R.L., dated 16.09.1971 as published in the Dhaka Gazette, 
Part 1, dated 21st October, 1971 
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Appendix  III  
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Appendix V 
 


























Photo 02: Ejlas (Court Room) of Chittagong Hill Tracts Land Dispute Resolution Commission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
